

NAFCOC, the State and National-Democratic Struggle

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EC. HISTORY.
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Finally we must stand in respect of those millions who since the appearance of white domination have struggled and died to regain their birthright, all those who have fallen in recent battles, and all who continue to take forward that just cause.

Without the inspiration of their sacrifice this work would be meaningless.

Aluta de classe continua!

Victoria e certa!

List of Abbreviations

ANC	- African National Congress
ASSA	- Association for Sociology in Southern Africa
Assocom	- Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry
BODOC	- Bopnuthatswana Chamber of Commerce
CMOP	- Capitalist mode of production
COSATU	- Congress of South African Trade Unions
CST	- "Colonialism of a Special Type"
JMC	- Joint Monitoring Centre
JSAS	- Journal of Southern African Studies
NACOC	- National African Chamber of Commerce
NAFCOC	- National African Federated Chambers of Commerce and Industry
NATRECO	- National Transvaal Regional Convention
NECC	- National Education Crisis Committee
SALB	- South African Labour Bulletin
SARS	- South African Research Service
SOUTACOC	- Southern Transvaal Chamber of Commerce
UCASA	- Urban Councils Association of South Africa
UDF	- United Democratic Front
UF	- Urban Foundation
USAID	- United States Agency for International Development

1. Introduction

This paper covers three broad areas of work, all of which relate to the problem of understanding the political position of what has been called in this paper the 'aspirant African bourgeoisie', what the state and capital refer to as the 'Black middle class'.

Firstly it is important to clarify the analytical tools we use to unravel reality. Hopefully the discussion on 'class' that initiates the paper will help avoid misunderstanding.

A large part of this dissertation consists of a review of orthodox historical materialist analysis of the South African social formation, and of revolutionary strategy generally. It is felt that the depth of this section will prevent a crudification of the orthodox position and will be useful when applied to concrete events later in the paper.

The state and capital embarked in the mid-70s on a programme of reform intended to ease the generalisation of monopoly capitalist relations of production and to stabilise the society politically. A section of this paper consists of a review and an analysis of the approach adopted by the state and white capital towards Black agents in order to exacerbate divisions among them and prevent cross-class unity.

NAFCOC is the organisation on which the central section of this paper focusses, looking at its recent history and its relationship to the state and capital in the period of 'reform'. An important theme

of the analysis of NAFCOC is the recent "shift to the left" of the organisation, and various indicators of this shift are mapped out.

Finally the paper engages brief discussion around the nature of the "radicalisation" of the aspirant African bourgeoisie, and factors for and against permanent solidarity with the oppressed masses.

Major sources

Sources used can be divided into six groups: Personal interviews with members of NAFCOC, sources close to the organisation and academics; NAFCOC literature, primarily its official mouthpiece African Business; Political texts from South Africa and other countries; Secondary material on the questions of the 'black middle class', total strategy and reform etc.; official reports and publications, including the reports of cabinet committees and departmental inquiries; and the press.

In terms of the interviews, I was disappointed that I was unable to do many "on the ground" with traders in the townships, in order to get a feeling for their attitudes and perceptions. Interviews with NAFCOC leadership in Johannesburg, while not offering much by way of empirical muscle, were very helpful in terms of fleshing out the sterile and clinical insights of the paperwork. Several dazzling insights into township politics were offered by academics in Johannesburg, notably Mark Swilling and Tom Lodge, while Yusuf Pahad in Retreat provided a much-needed political analysis of his constituency.

Also to be singled out is the use made of the information provided by the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) through their annual surveys and their Topical Opinion.

In the secondary material special mention must be made of the influence of Dan O'Meara on the politics of the state in the 70s and 80s, and Roger Southall whose work was most thorough around the question of NAFCOD and the bantustans.

Before we launch into the paper proper, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of several terms. I have used the term "aspirant African bourgeoisie" to narrow down our area of focus. 'African' denotes those who by virtue of historical ethnic and cultural factors form the indigenous peoples of South Africa ('black' refers to all groups who by virtue of ethnic and physiological features are excluded from access to state power). 'Aspirant bourgeoisie' denotes those who have ownership over or access to control over the means of production, but who due to their exclusion from state power cannot operate as a bourgeoisie in a "normal" capitalist state.

"Black middle class" is a term coined and employed by the state and its monopoly capital allies, and is used here mainly to denote those groupings whom the state has seen fit to attempt to co-opt into support for the regime and reform.

2. Theoretical discussion - class and revolution

2a. The nature of class and its application to political practice

The discussion we are embarking on, and the ramifications thereof for political practice, hinge on our understanding of the concept of "social class".

We must be careful here to be clear as regards what level of abstraction we are concerned with, and rigorously reject any confusion or conflation of concepts of differing degrees of concreteness. The reification of analytical tools such as the concept "mode of production" to apply it to distinct sectors in the economy, or the use of such descriptive shorthand as "oppression" as a valid materialist concept are equally damning both from an academic and a political point of view.

At the level of abstraction of the "mode of production", "class" is defined as a relation of an agent to the means of production. The extraction of surplus, the law of value and the valorisation of capital (the defining characteristics of the Capitalist Mode of Production [CMOP]) are determined by the essence of the relationship between the producers and the means of production.

"The specific economic form in which unpaid labour is pumped out of direct producers determines the relationship of rulers and ruled...It is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers ... which reveals the innermost

secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure...." [Marx Capital vol iii p 791] (1)

The political and ideological superstructure which together with the productive forces complete the ambit of the concept "mode of production" are determined at this level by the productive forces and relations of production.

Similarly, the "primary contradiction", the contradiction between the socialized production of surplus and the private appropriation thereof, which generates the contradiction between the producers of surplus and the owners of the means of production, exists at this level of abstraction,

"Surplus value... constitutes simultaneously the relation between capitalists and workers and the antagonism between them". (Laclau 1979:104)

while simultaneously having a real material existence and determining the limits and conditions of existence (and resolution) of contradictions at other levels.

Thus Mao: "In this very simple phenomenon (in this "cell" of bourgeois society) analysis reveals all the contradictions (or the germ of all the contradictions) of modern society" (2)

The limited applicability of this level of analysis (that of the mode of production) to concrete social processes necessitates a level of analysis or paradigm that is able to accommodate notions of

(1) Quoted in Morris, M: "The development of capitalism in South African Agriculture: class struggle in the countryside" in Murray, MJ, ed.: "South African Capitalism and Black Political Opposition"

(2) Mao Tse Tung: "On contradiction" (photostat)

consciousness, historically-determined relations of power (political relations of domination), peculiar objective conditions of a social formation as well as subjective conditions relating to levels of organisation, politicisation etc.

Laclau poses "antagonism" at two levels of analysis: that of the "mode of production" (which he regards as "class struggle" proper) as well as that "where the struggle between classes only becomes intelligible if the overall political and ideological relations of domination characterising a determinate social formation are brought to bear," (which he labels the arena of "popular-democratic struggle") (1979:105)

I would argue however that the second level of analysis must admit the concept class and class struggle. This is essential if we are to discern and distinguish the interests of the classes making up the "people". "Class" at this level will refer to identifiable groups involved in struggle, such as "the Russian peasantry", the "African working class", groups which should not be seen as identified or constituted solely at the level of relations of production, but also in terms of "the ensemble of political and ideological relations of domination".

The failure of modern Western Marxist theories of class to clarify the relationship between the various levels of abstraction as well as to explicate the nature of the determinacy of the economic and the relative autonomy (and momentum) of the political and ideological instances is notable.

Thus Poulantzas argues that the economic instance is determinate in constituting class and class power, but that these classes only have meaning when organised at the level of social relations of production:

"The relations of production have as their effect on social relations ..., a distribution of agents of production into social classes which are at this level the social relations of production."

He acknowledges also that

"...the constitution of classes is not related to the economic level alone, but consists of an effect of the ensemble of the levels of a mode of production or of a social formation." (my emphasis) (3)

While the formal recognition of the role of the political and ideological instances is welcome, Poulantzas does not clarify at what level of abstraction he is dealing with and seems to be generalising from analysis of the CMOP.

Moreover applications of the Poulantzian method to the determination of the size and political importance of the African middle classes in South Africa confine the constituent role of political and ideological factors to the determination of classes at the level of the production process.

(3) Poulantzas, N: "Political Power and Social Classes", Verso, 1975 p.69.

Thus Crankshaw (4) writes that although managers and supervisors perform productive work,

"they are excluded from the working class by virtue of the political roles which they perform in the production process."

Similarly,

"ideological relations in the social division of labour excludes engineers and technicians from the working class, and places them instead, in the new petit bourgeoisie." (1986:11)

Crankshaw continues to say that an analysis of class structure cannot, "in itself, provide a basis for predictions concerning the outcome of class struggle," and that "such a project would require an analysis of the actual organisation of classes within such a structure". (1986:16)

It seems here that Crankshaw commits the error seemingly common to much historical materialist writing on South Africa. This error is the application of an unmediated class analysis to the social formation, which while for form's sake acknowledges the importance of political and ideological factors, nevertheless proceeds to see class power as constituted primarily in the economic instance and then wielded through the political and ideological apparatuses.

This method ignores both the complex political reality of relations of domination in South Africa, which cannot be reduced to the sway of monopoly capital, as well as the contradictory and politically

(4) Crankshaw, O: "Theories of Class and the African "Middle Class" in South Africa, 1969-1983", Africa Perspective 1986 p3.

crucial way in which Black and White subjects are interpellated. Neither of these fundamental determinants can be "read off" from an analysis of the class structure as determined at the level of the mode of production.

These determinants can only be fully appreciated in an analytical framework that is able to take account of the matrix of historical economic and political factors that have determined the current conjuncture: an analysis that can moreover theorise the social contradictions arising out of this matrix in order to provide progressive political practice with a strategy in order to change that society in the interests of the producing classes.

2b. COLONIALISM OF A SPECIAL TYPE AND POLITICAL STRATEGY

The Sixth World Congress of the Communist International which met in August and September 1928 included South Africa in its deliberations on the revolutionary movement in the colonies and semi-colonies, while the Executive Committee adopted a lengthy resolution on the "South African Question". Crucial to both discussions was the formulation of the "Native Republic" thesis, which proposed the attainment of an "independent native South African republic as a stage towards a workers' and peasants' republic with full, equal rights for all races". (5)

The basis for this slogan lay in the characterisation of South Africa as a "British Dominion of the colonial type", in which "the Native population (except in the Cape province) of the country have no political rights and the power of the State has been monopolised by the white bourgeoisie", whose interests are "becoming more and more blended with the interests of British financial and industrial capital".

The struggle for a Native Republic was according to the ECCI a struggle against "British imperialism, against the white bourgeoisie and the white and black reformist leaders". Acknowledging the need

(5) excerpts from: Executive Committee of the Communist International: "The South African Question" in South African Communists Speak; London 1980

for the Africanisation of the struggle meant for the ECCI the support by the CPSA for the national liberation of the African majority:

"South Africa is a black country, the majority of its population is black and so is the majority of the workers and peasants. The bulk of the South African population is the black peasantry, whose land has been expropriated by the white minority. Seven eighths of the land is owned by whites. Hence the national question in South Africa, which is based upon the agrarian question lies at the foundation of the revolution in South Africa." (6)

Hence support was urged for the "embryonic national organisations among the natives, such as the African National Congress", in order to transform it into a "fighting nationalist revolutionary organisation against the white bourgeoisie and the British imperialists".

The thesis of "Colonialism of a Special Type" was first fully explicated in "The Road to South African Freedom", the programme of the South African Communist Party which was adopted at the fifth national conference of the Party in 1962. The thesis provided the descriptive and analytical framework for the Party programme of "National Democratic Revolution". (7)

(6) Ibid.

(7) in "South African Communists Speak": London 1980

Colonialism of a Special Type emphasised the basic continuity of racial domination and exclusion of all black agents from political and economic power, and the historic monopoly of that power by whites.

The conquest by Dutch and British imperialists of the indigenous peoples and the entraining of the indigenous majority as labour was a feature of the social formation before the discovery of gold and diamonds in the hinterland. However the latter development saw the rapid and general introduction and imposition of monopoly capitalist relations of production and the proletarianisation of the masses of Africans.

This process depended primarily on the maintenance and intensification of colonial forms of domination, including indirect rule. The intervention of the colonial state was necessary to destroy the independent indigenous economies and procure labour. At no stage was it necessary to enlist the political support of the indigenous population to ensure the entrenchment of capitalist relations (as it had been in the metropolitan social formations), indeed the survival of the mines and continued capitalist accumulation depended centrally on the super-exploitation of the African workers and the subsidy of the wage by the reserve economies.

Consolidation of the white ruling bloc occurred after protracted political and armed struggle over precisely which white grouping would be dominant in the developing capitalist social formation. The Union of 1910 saw the rapprochement of the white ruling classes under

"all democratic rights and political domination by a group which ... emphasise[s] and perpetuate[s] its 'alien' European character".

The Road to South African Freedom argues that "there are no acute or antagonistic class divisions at present among the African people", the "professional groups" not as a rule earning salaries or living differently from their fellow Africans. Indeed, the "intellectuals and the professional groups among the Africans share with their people all the hardships and indignities of colonialism", and many from amongst them have "sacrificed all hopes of privilege and advancement in order to join wholly with their people".

The restrictions and limitations on the African commercial class mean that their interests "lie wholly in joining the workers and rural people for the overthrow of White supremacy".

The tasks of the Party in this framework is seen as the continuous striving for the "building and strengthening of a united front of national liberation, the unity of Communists and non-Communists, the unity of freedom-loving people of all nationalities and all anti-colonialist classes in the national democratic revolution."

The basis for these tasks lies in the identification of the "fundamental contradictions of South African society: between the oppressed people and their rulers, between South African colonialism and the world-wide movement against colonialism and imperialism; between the working class and the rural masses, together with the middle classes, on the one side, and the handful of monopoly capitalists on the other." (8)

(8) Ibid.

The main content of the "National Democratic Revolution" is the national liberation of the African majority and its main aim the establishment of a national democratic state.

Further theoretical explication of the Colonialism of a Special Type thesis is necessary. CST sees the state as "two-faced" - with "elements of bourgeois parliamentary democracy on the one hand and a highly coercive state apparatus, directed primarily at the Black masses, on the other." (9)

This two-faced form of state wields power in favour of the white colonial ruling bloc. The latter is a "national" alliance of classes made up primarily of the White bourgeoisie and White sections of the petty-bourgeoisie and the proletariat respectively. While class contradictions do exist, they are generally limited in favour of maintaining colonial domination.

Class and class-fractional divisions also exist in the colonised bloc consisting of all oppressed groupings. The major constituents of the colonised bloc are the black proletariat, the semi-proletarianised peasantry and the black minority of the petty-bourgeoisie. All of these are oppressed (though to varying degrees of intensity) and all share a common interest in the national liberation of the African majority.

The question of the validity of the application of the national question to the South African social formation has occupied many

(9) Anon: "Colonialism of a Special Kind and the South African State: A consideration of recent articles", Africa Perspective 1980.

reams of academic writing. The "nation" has long been part of the conceptual armoury of historical materialism and is prominent in the writing of Lenin, Gramsci, Ho Chi Minh, Cabral and others.

The political constitution of the nation arises from a combination of social and "ethnic" factors. The social factors include economic ties and the historical unity of classes and class fractions that these inspire. "Ethnic" factors include the "culture, way of life, beliefs, traditions, mentality and psychology shaped by the geographical environment, common origin and centuries of historical development.." The social factors are "dialectically connected", "unbreakably united", with the ethnic, although it is the "social (class) factors that always play the determining role". (10)

The nation has been defined as

"a lasting historical community of people constituting a form of social development based on the community of economic life in combination with the community of language, territory, culture, consciousness and psychology." (Fedoseyev et al 1977: 27)

While many of these features are as yet latent or suppressed in the African nation-in-becoming, a great spur to the national unity of the African people is their common experience of oppression and suppression of their culture.

This oppression of Africans and other blacks constitutes them as one of the poles of the contradiction between oppressor and oppressed, defining the "dominant contradiction" of the South African social formation. This is a contradiction "whose intelligibility

(10) Fedoseyev, P N et al, : "Leninism and the National Question", Progress, Moscow 1977.

depends on the ensemble of political and ideological relations of domination and not just the relations of production" (Laclau 1979:108)

The dominant contradiction designates the dominant line-up of social forces in a particular social formation. If we agree that the form of state in South Africa is predicated on the monopoly of political power by the white bloc and the exclusion of blacks from all but token representation, we can conclude that the "dominant contradiction", that between oppressor and oppressed, is an essential contradiction of South African society (i.e. it cannot be resolved within the present state).

It has been argued that the specific structure of the South African economy and the conditions of reproduction of monopoly capitalist relations are similarly dependent on white minority rule and the subordination of black agents in the economy. The implications of this are that the resolution of the dominant contradiction (while not ushering in socialism) must overthrow the dominance of monopoly capital and fundamentally alter the balance of forces in favour of the working class.

The articulation of the two essential contradictions of South African society - the primary/determinant and the dominant occur in a complex unity, the latter being determined by the former:

"... in capitalist society the two forces in contradiction, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, form the principal contradiction. The other contradictions, such as those between the remnant feudal class and the bourgeoisie, between the peasant petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie, between the non-monopoly capitalists and the

capitalists, between bourgeois democracy and bourgeois fascism, among the capitalist countries and between imperialism and the colonies, are all determined or influenced by this principal contradiction" (11)

While this may provide us with the basis for understanding social conflict in South Africa, it remains a framework of analysis of objective conditions, and cannot identify the forces of change and reaction that are grouped around those objective contradictions. The notion of the "people's camp" provides us with a means of analysing the balance of forces at a given stage.

Who are the people? It is clear that we cannot simply collapse the notion of "progressive forces" into that of the "oppressed", simply because objectively their interests are in contradiction to monopoly capital, the state and its allies. At the same time it would be dangerous to claim that the qualification for inclusion is based on class position, i.e. that it is the working class and the semi-proletarianised rural masses who are the "real" people, while others are merely tactical and temporary allies. Not only would this deny the revolutionary potential and contribution of non-working-class classes and strata, but it would gloss over the attempts of the state (in some cases successful) to recruit allies from amongst the more skilled and the more backward working-class sectors.

Neither can the people's camp consist solely of those sectors mobilised in progressive organisation, leaving out those sectors yet untouched or bound up in ethnic and conservative structures.

(11) Mao: "On Contradiction" p.289

Rather the people's camp consists of those sectors who at a particular stage contribute to the prosecution of the immediate goals of national democratic struggle. This means that there are many who may qualify at one conjuncture, yet fall plainly outside at another. Importantly, the distinction between the people's camp and the summation of the oppressed allows for the inclusion of organisations and activists who by birth and background fall into the oppressor bloc.

"...the concept of a people as a specific social community is historically precise and may have a different social essence in different conditions, countries and even at various stages of development of one and the same country.

...a people is a community of the working classes, but it can also include other sections of the population, which.... participate in promoting historical progress in the given time and the given circumstances".
(12)

The imperative for unity amongst the oppressed has in recent times been consistently critiqued as a threat to working-class hegemony and a veiled attempt to obfuscate class differences among the oppressed. The question of cross-class unity is not unique to the South African question, nor is the identification of a dominant contradiction. Although fearful of overstressing the point, reference to how the question has been addressed elsewhere is necessary.

Primarily and obviously, unity is stressed in terms of winning the maximum number of class and class-fractional allies at the same time as narrowing the social base of the class enemy and stripping it of supportive classes.

(12) Chirkin, V Y, and Yudin, Y A: "A Socialist-Oriented State: Instrument of Revolutionary Change", Progress, Moscow 1978

"So what was the question of unity in our land? Fundamentally it was simply this: in the first place, as everyone knows, union makes for strength. Right from the moment when there came into the heads of some sons of our soil the idea of eliminating foreign colonialist domination, there arose a question of strength, the strength necessary to be pitted against the strength of the colonialists..." (13)

Many have correctly emphasised the danger of collapsing the alliance of classes and strata that make up the popular bloc into a single undifferentiated mass. It is crucial that the common factors that unite the popular classes are not mistaken for a simple identity of interests.

Lenin (14) has stressed that the contradiction between the two classes involved in the democratic revolution (the proletariat and the peasantry) was real and would arise in struggle between them once the contradiction between themselves and Tsarism had been resolved:

"Beyond the bounds of democratism there can be no question of the proletariat and the peasant bourgeoisie having a single will. Class struggle between them is inevitable, but it is in a democratic republic that this struggle will be the most thoroughgoing and widespread struggle of the people for socialism."

The immediate objective for the proletariat was the winning of a democratic republic, in the struggle for which the greatest number of allies was needed, on a common programme of democracy:

"The absence of unity on questions of socialism and in the struggle for socialism does not preclude singleness of will on questions of democracy and in the

(13) Cabral, A: "Unity and struggle", in Cabral, A: "The Weapon of Theory" p.30.

(14) Lenin, VI: "Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution" in Selected Works vol2 p104

struggle for a republic. To forget this would be tantamount to forgetting the logical and historical difference between a democratic revolution and a socialist revolution. To forget this would be tantamount to forgetting the character of the democratic revolution as one of the whole people....

In the Vietnamese people's struggle the importance of building and strengthening the united front against imperialist aggression did not prevent the differentiation of the class interests of the constituent classes. In fact the strengthening of unity was seen to be dependent on precisely the identification of the commonality and divergence of class interests at different stages:

"One cannot conceive of a classless front....one should view and solve all problems related to the Front policy from a class standpoint. There are classes with essentially similar interests and classes whose interests converge only to a certain extent. Each class, for the sake of its own and the common interests, joins forces with other classes within the Front. Moreover, the common interest itself is viewed by each class from its own angle. On account of the historical position of the proletariat, its class interest and the common national interest are the same. But for the other classes, their respective interests and the common national interest converge in some respects and diverge in others. For this reason, there must necessarily be a struggle between the viewpoints of the various members of the Front who represent different classes, even though the Front must strive to maintain and strengthen unity. One-sided unity unaccompanied by struggle leads in practice to the disruption of unity and the collapse of the Front." (15)

As Cronin has warned, the flip-side of class-blind populism is the inability or "failure to strategise around class differences in the enemy camp" (16). The exploitation of the contradictions that exist between classes and strata in the enemy camp is crucial in order to

(15) Le Duan: "Problems of Revolutionary Strategy" p162

(16) Cronin, J: "The Question of Unity - A Reply" SALB vol 11 no3 Jan 1986 p32

weaken the unity and hence power of that class alliance and in order to isolate and strike blows at the most dangerous enemy. As Lenin put it:

"The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and by the most thorough, careful, attentive, skilful and obligatory use of any, even the smallest, rift between the enemies, any conflict among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries, and also by taking advantage of any, even the smallest, opportunity of winning a mass ally, even though this ally is temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional." (17)

We have covered much ground in this discussion, much of it by way of reference to the "classics". The value of this discussion of class, CST and the ramifications of revolutionary theory for South Africa will be clear when we delve deeper into the question of the position of the African middle classes in the current conjuncture.

(17) Lenin, V I: "'Left-Wing' Communism - An Infantile Disorder"; Progress, Moscow 1981 p55

3. TOTAL STRATEGY - STATE AND CAPITAL MANOEUVRE

3a. The Military - Monopoly Alliance takes shape

The protracted economic expansion of the 60's saw the generalisation of monopoly capitalist relations of production, often under the patronage of parastatal corporations, and the centralisation of ownership of the economy as a whole under several monopolies.

This period also saw an unprecedented influx of foreign capital that took the form of penetration by multinationals, particularly of US origin.

This development occurred simultaneously with the assertion of US hegemony globally, with the expansion of US interests being particularly notable in the penetration of the European economies and the recently decolonised states of the periphery, particularly in Africa, Indochina and Latin America. South Africa was no exception to this phenomenon. In the years since World War II, and especially since 1960, multinational corporations have multiplied their investments in South Africa, direct investment by United States corporations having more than doubled since 1969.

However the "boom" of the 60's, predicated on the national oppression and super-exploitation of the African masses (the word used here in its scientific sense to connote the range of popular classes and non-class groupings oppressed by a particular social order), did not resolve but intensified both the essential and non-

essential contradictions of the system. Along with the heightened level of contradiction within the social formation came the mediated impact of the changing balance of forces internationally, particularly the demise of colonial rule and the growing power of the non-aligned movement.

Several factors of the organic crisis that gathered momentum in the early and mid-70s concern us directly. Two main categories present themselves: those factors / symptoms that concern directly the ability of the state to perform its functions (broadly defined as: the resolution of contradictions among the ruling classes and class strata and the reproduction of conditions for continued capitalist accumulation, including functions of repression and socialisation of the dominated classes); and those factors / symptoms that had a bearing on the immediate imperatives of capitalist accumulation (problems of productivity and valorisation).

The regime as structured under Vorster was clearly unable to respond creatively to the mass resistance gathering momentum within the country and the growing isolation of South Africa in the subcontinent. The security analysis offered by the dominant security force (the Bureau for State Security [BOSS] which was Vorster's power base) saw the political crisis primarily in terms of conspiracies by agitators. BOSS was caught off-guard by the events of June 1976 and reacted without any clear strategy. The military under PW Botha and Malan were particularly angered by the failure of the incursion into Angola in the summer of 1975-76, which had occurred at the insistence of BOSS.

These debates pointed to the imperative of a clear, holistic approach to the question of national security and the centralisation of thinking around security. Such an approach had been under development in the military for some time, under the influence particularly of French and United States doctrines of national security. Such doctrines emphasised the need for a militarily defensible policy that would ensure a greater degree of domestic stability.

At this stage the NP was dominated by the more right-wing elements of the North, representing "an alliance of capitalist farmers, white workers and sections of the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie, particularly those employed by the state" (18) . The response of these elements to the political and economic crisis was a demand in essence for intensification of national oppression and exploitation of black agents: the maintenance of "tight influx control measures, restrictions on the employment of skilled African labour, no form of recognition of African trade unions and continued state control of the infrastructural sectors of the economy". (O'Meara 1980:11)

The perception that these policies would intensify the multi-faceted crisis of the state consolidated the association of reformist elements (e.g. in the Cape NP which was dominated by large-scale capital intensive farmers and Sanlam finance capital), with the security concerns of the military and allied forces.

(18) O'Meara, D: "Muldergate and the Politics of Afrikaner Nationalism"; WIP 22 p 11

Capital was faced by deep-seated structural obstacles to continued accumulation. The change to capital intensive processes as part of the monopolisation of the South African economy saw a shift from dependence on cheap unskilled migrant labour towards demand for large numbers of semi-skilled operatives in a stable workforce. The "boom" of the 60's and the continued influx of foreign investment capital cushioned the effects of the dislocation of the lack of a skilled workforce: however this "skills crisis" reared its head in the recessionary conditions of the early 1970's.

Another major concern of capital's was the small size of the internal market, determined largely by the impoverishment of the Black market (the white consumer market largely saturated by this stage), and the obstacles placed in the way of the full exploitation of the Black market by the logic of Verwoerdian "separate development".

It was clear that the maintenance of a rigid racial division of labour and the structural obstacles to labour mobility, including Bantu Education and township conditions, were posing a threat to the interests of capital.

This threat was nowhere more clearly illustrated than in the growing militancy of the working class and its allied classes and strata. Strike waves and the growing organisation, still strictly illegal, of the African working class, became a theme of the early and mid 70's while the growing unity and solidarity of students and workers, as well as most other sectors of the oppressed under the

black Consciousness banner gave warning that the acquiescence of the dominated classes in their oppression could not be relied on.

The coalescence of the various aspects of the crisis impacted on the state to prompt the strengthening of the alliance between the military and Afrikaner capital and the intervention of both of these sectors into political struggles over state policy (O'Meara 1980:12).

The formulation of the concept of "Total Strategy" (which we will return to below) and its explication in the 1977 White Paper on Defence was closely followed by a symposium on "National Security" hosted by the Institute for Strategic Studies in Pretoria and attended by representatives of the US military, the SADF and academics close to Afrikaner capital (19), as well as a meeting convened by the National Management and Development Foundation attended by "key business leaders, senior military officers and Department of Labour officials". (O'Meara 1980:13)

All of these developments provided an opportunity for the alliance to establish and refine a base-line programme, and for the wider implications of their technocratic proposals to be thoroughly canvassed. Crucial to these deliberations was a stressing of the global context of the crisis in South Africa, and an emphasis on the articulation of South African national security with the interests, both economic and geo-political of the US and other imperialist states. The fact that the bid for power of the Botha grouping occurred in the context of the intensification of a world-wide crisis

(19) see Louw, M H H, ed.: "National Security: A Modern Approach"

for capitalist accumulation and US imperialism reinforced the perceived need from both quarters to refine the counter-revolutionary capability of the regime and to enhance its stability.

The victory of the technocratic-reformist alliance came about after the "Infogate" scandal, the circumstances of which need not concern us here. What is crucial for our concerns is that this victory was not predicated on the power of the faction within the National Party itself, nor within the upper echelons of the state Departments. The accession of the reformists was only assured through the intervention of the military into political struggles, the unprecedented united action of the capitalist classes, its organisations and especially its press against the right-wing as exemplified by Connie Mulder and in favour of reform. In a very real sense, then, PW Botha owed his position to forces outside of the National Party. His programme represented an alliance of those forces and ran contrary to the economic and political interests of broad sectors of the National Party support base.

The jettisoning of traditional NP supporters (Transvaal farmers and civil servants, sectors of the white petty-bourgeoisie, the white proletariat) added urgency to the imperative of consolidating support from capital and broadening the "reform coalition" to include sectors of the African, Indian and Coloured middle classes and commercial bourgeoisie. (20) This was by no means an uncontradictory process. Many of Monopoly capital's demands represented progress relative to

(20) see Huntington, S P: "Reform and Stability in a modernising, Multi-Ethnic Society" *Politikon* vol 8 no 2 December 1981; p 6

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the prevailing situation and did in a real sense unshackle the economy from restrictions that had outlived their functionality (the easing of restrictions on labour mobility, the recognition of African Trade unions etc.). However the consolidation and streamlining of monopoly capital meant increased pressure on small business, especially in a time of deep recession. This was even more the case when reforms included the opening of the Black market to white monopoly retailers and other concerns.

- the re-ordering of the economy in the interests of monopoly capital;

- the defusing of potential black political resistance through reforms that would:

- * establish a stable, semi-skilled urban workforce separate from the concerns and struggles of the unemployed and rural poor in the bantustans,

- * neutralise the militancy of the independent trade unions in bureaucratic union structures,

- * encourage accumulation by a "Black middle class" which would (at least) be less likely to unite in struggle with the masses, preferably steer the liberation movement onto a reformist course or at best come out in open support of the regime and gradual reform.

The re-organisation of the state under FW Botha and "Total Strategy" saw the centralisation of power away from elected representatives towards appointees of the dominant forces in the new order. (22) The power of the Cabinet was substantially reduced, being replaced by four Cabinet Committees (Security, Constitutional Affairs, Economic Affairs and Social Affairs). Each is chaired by the State President or his nominee and are empowered to make decisions over and above the Cabinet. Each committee consists of representatives of the military, the government and "experts" from the business or academic fields. Botha has in this way been able to

(22) see Geldenhuys, D and Kotze, H: "Aspects of Political Decision-making in South Africa"; Politikon vol 10 no 1 June 1983

bypass the factionalism of the National Party qua party and ensure the dominance of the military-monopoly alliance.

By far the most powerful of these bodies is the State Security Council (SSC) which is chaired by the State President and acts in essence as an "inner cabinet", dealing de facto with almost every facet of government activity. The Council comprises of Cabinet Ministers, seconded top officials in the security forces, including the heads of National Intelligence, the Defence Force, the Commissioner of Police and Ministerial Secretaries.

The Secretariat of the SSC (SSSC), headed by General AJ Van Deventer, implements the decisions of the SSC and represents the most powerful bureaucratic structure in the State apparatus. It is fed by both National and Military Intelligence Services and controls fifteen Interdepartmental Committees (IDCs), which cover all aspects of state activity and draw on the expertise of both government officials and private corporations. The final aspect of the National Security Management System that is perhaps more important to us is the series of Joint Management Centres (JMCs), nine of which serve the different geographical areas of South Africa. These areas coincide with the areal commands of the SADF. The JMCs are made up of representatives from business, community councils, ex-development boards, the Police and Defence Force. Each is chaired by a member of the latter two "security forces". In smaller centres "sub-JMCs" and "mini-JMCs" are constituted. The tasks of these bodies, which are accountable only to the State Security Council, includes assessing the security situation

in each region and recommending "solutions", including security action or upgrading.

We shall return later to examine the extent to which the JMCs, for long inactive, have been re-activated in the wake of the June 1986 state of Emergency to regain the political initiative in each region.

Several commentators have seen the extension of the doctrine of "National Security" to the economic sphere in terms of the articulation of a "division of labour" between state and capital in the interests of maintaining political, social and economic stability (23). While the state would deal with the ordering and restructuring of the economy for a more "rational" exploitation of resources and to ensure the orderly reproduction of the economy, capital would be able to take over many of the state's enterprises through privatisation. The latter would be responsible for the "welfare" functions in the economy and the tackling of the problems causing social dislocation, which would be decentralised away from the state and thus hopefully depoliticised. (24)

The "reform consensus" between Botha and business expressed most forcefully at the Carlton Conference of 1979 resulted in reformist manoeuvres designed to satisfy the changed imperatives of monopoly

(23) Wilkinson, P: "Straddling Realities: The Urban Foundation and Social Change in Contemporary South Africa"; African Studies Seminar Paper, Wits 1982

(24) Lombard, J: "The Economic Aspects of National Security: Some Policy Considerations"; in Louw, HH (op.cit.) p92

capitalist accumulation at the same time as stabilise the townships politically. While the rhetoric and many of the proposed reforms went far beyond Verwoerdian principles, at no stage did they begin to threaten the monopoly of economic power held by White monopoly capital.

Thus the most urgent moves took place around the question of legislative restrictions on the mobility, utilisation and training of African labour, in order to facilitate the reorganisation of production along more capital intensive lines (O'Meara 1980:16). Another major prong, in line with the free enterprise discourse of "Total Strategy", was the gradual reduction of state control of the key sectors of the economy and the privatisation drive of the early 80's.

Importantly, one of the first deviations from Verwoerdian logic was the lifting of all restrictions on the investment by white capitalists in the African townships. It is certain that this reform came about not through the demands of black businessmen but because of pressure from white capital eager to get at the Black market. We shall see to what extent this has endeared African businessmen to "free enterprise South Africa style".

Before we leave the issue of the restructuring of the economy, it is important to note several qualifications on the way we see the relationship between state and capital. While rapprochement and "teamwork" were the catchphrases at the time of the Carlton

Conference, this did not last long as business realised that the heady talk of reform was making little progress into practice. The fracture between the two has opened further as a result of the heightened political conflict over the intervening six years, the divisions particularly serious over how to deal with the struggles of the masses. Thus it is problematic to see the activities of state and capital as working in tune in terms of some hidden agenda. The state is no mere instrument in the hands of the most powerful class, but is constituted through (and is itself a site of) struggle between the classes who enjoy political access to the state; thus primarily between the constituent classes and class-fractions of the ruling bloc, although the struggles of dominated classes do impact directly on the apparatuses.

An important digression we must embark on is a discussion of the progression of government strategy towards urban Africans.

3c. From Riekert to RSC's

The aim of the urbanisation strategy mapped out by the Riekert report of 1979 was to resolve the political crisis in the townships by giving recognition to the permanence of urban Africans and to secure their economic welfare and social stability by protecting them from competition for jobs from the relatively impoverished rural workforce. (25)

A sharp distinction was drawn between the settled urban "insiders" with section 10 rights and the "outsiders" with temporary employment

(25) see Cobbett, W et al: "South Africa's Regional Economy: A critical analysis of reform strategy in the 1980s" p3

contracts in the cities. The former were to be given mobility within the urban areas while the latter were to be subject to far stricter controls.

An important corollary of the Riekert proposals was the establishment of Black Local Authorities (by the Act of that name of 1983), which was meant to substitute in the urban areas for the self-government "enjoyed" by Africans in the "National States", and serve as a replacement for the lack of participation in central government. While the new local authorities would enjoy unprecedented power (eg. rent, tax and fee collection, the issuing of licences etc managed by Africans themselves) they were meant to be self-financing.

This sophisticated attempt at "divide and rule" has largely failed notwithstanding repeated attempts to implement aspects of the strategy. It has failed largely because of resistance to its proposals not only from the squatters resisting removals, the workers refusing to turn their backs on their rural cousins, and organisations of the dominated classes, but also from sections of big capital who regarded the proposals as short-sighted tinkering. (26) The Black local authorities lie in shambles due to the unprecedented mobilisation of 1984-1986 against their lack of representivity and the rents increases they were forced to impose as a result of their fiscal base.

(26) Ibid, op.cit.

The state has come back from the drawing board with proposals based not on the impractical division between Bantustans and "White South Africa" but on the centres of gravity of the economy: the eight development regions established in 1981 and 1982. "Regional Services Councils" (RSCs) will replace the provinces as the second tier of government. These councils encompass all local authorities within a region, including the African Town and Community Councils and are responsible for functional administration as opposed to political representation. Control will remain largely in white hands, representation being based on each authority's financial contributions. However a major aspect of the RSC initiative is the aim of providing the African township bodies with a source of finance: a limited redistribution from the white areas to the townships. We shall return to this question at a later stage in the paper.

An oft-stated interpretation of "Total Strategy" has been the attempt to broaden the social base of the reform process to include sectors of the "Black middle class".(27) This has included both legislative changes and institutional interventions.

The Riekert commission made several recommendations regarding African entrepreneurs, including the opening of CBDs to all races, the standardisation of issuing of licences to all race groups and the

(27) eg. Huntington 1981 op.cit p23 and Hermann Gilliomee: "The political and economic implications of co-operation or conflict in South Africa"; in "Co-operation or conflict in Southern Africa - the planning implications": Proceedings of Second Annual Conference of the Long Range Planning Society of Southern Africa, March 17 1981

dropping of restrictions on the number of businesses that could be owned by - Africans. The Group Areas Amendment Act of 1984 allowed the introduction of 'free trade zones' in the white CBDs. Government has stated repeatedly the intention to create a stable middle class through the means of promoting home ownership, upgrading urban infrastructure and the promotion of black business.

A crucial instrument for the implementation of the latter has been the sponsorship of "small business" by a variety of state bodies and parastatals, including bantustan Development Corporations, Institutes attached to universities, and the Small Business Development Corporation. The latter arose out of the Carlton Conference of 1979 due to "...increasing awareness in recent years that a new approach was needed to encourage small business entrepreneurship amongst all population groups". (28) Dr Motsuenyane of NAFDCOC is a member of the board of directors, which is appropriate since most of its loans are to African entrepreneurs.

Capital has not been remiss over support for the development of a "Black middle class". Political strategists close to capital urged that account be taken of the aspirations of this grouping. Thus Hermann Gilliomee, speaking of a Black stabilising force in the townships:

"...there is a growing petty bourgeoisie, but their loyalties can go either way: they have to be competed for. The Black capitalists proper are safer, sounder allies. However, the number of businessmen remain

(28) Hudson, P and Sarakinsky, M: "Class interests and politics: the case of the urban African bourgeoisie": South African Review 3, SARS and Ravan 1986 p179

extremely small and almost wholly dependent upon white support. The chances of an African capitalist class taking off into self-sustaining growth are minimal, unless it is directed and subsidised by the state and white business interests. This will ensure their loyalty but their value as political auxiliaries during unrest is limited.

"In the end the loyalty of the Black middle class will depend on whether the government and business can meet their rising aspirations and protect them. If a reasonable growth rate and a programme of reform is maintained, one can expect this middle class to continue to adopt a reformist position favouring changes within the existent framework. However, the support of the Black middle class could abruptly be ended by anything that seriously threatened the military or economic stability of South Africa." (Gilliomee 1981:15)

While it would be problematic to conflate the wishes and stratagem of a particular class with what it has been able to achieve, it is instructive to observe also what the leadership of the monopoly capitalist class has said about the "Black middle class". Rosholt, executive chairman of Barlow Rand, in a speech in June 1984, that the "survival of the free enterprise system" (i.e. monopoly capital) depended on the activism and pressure exerted by businessmen.

"Unless the blacks, who represent the majority group, enjoy their fair share of the fruits of the system - which presupposes they must be in a position to participate in it - they will most certainly reject it."
(29)

He advocates a five-pronged approach to the "problem":

- Education reforms,
- training,
- the advancement of blacks into senior managerial positions,

(29) Rosholt, A M: "The businessman's role in the changing circumstances of South Africa", speech to Harvard Business School Club, June 21 1984. Reprinted as SAIRR Topical Opinion PD 6/84

- the elimination of discrimination from the workplace
and finally

- "support for organisations which are doing a great deal to ensure survival of the free enterprise system".

As regards the third point above (advancement of Black agents into managerial positions) he tells of "white attitudinal problems" and a "lack of real commitment by the great majority of businessmen", which is an obstacle to demonstrating that the system "is not just a white preserve". (Rosholt 1984:3)

Apart from referring to NAFDOC specifically, in regard to the fifth point, Rosholt seems to mean those private sector organisations that are fostering African entrepreneurs. These include the banks; Standard's Business Development and Advisory Dept, Barclays Small Business Unit, Trust Bank's Bureau for Business Management; organised commerce and industry; and such other institutes as Small Business Advisory Services and the Urban Foundation.

The most significant of these is the last-named. The Urban Foundation arose out of concern in private circles about the "quality of life in urban communities" and was established after a conference held in November 1976. A propaganda leaflet of the Foundation claimed it was aiming to create a "free market economy, a stable black middle class with the necessary security of tenure, personal security, and a feeling of hope for the betterment in the hearts of all our people". (Wilkinson 1982:4)

Although the UF was able to assiduously pursue its goals throughout the late 70s and early 80s, and even achieved some headway with the granting of the 99-year leasehold scheme in December 1978, its campaign began to come unstuck, for two important reasons.

Firstly, as we have noted above, the reformist momentum within the state began to experience problems due mostly to official foot-dragging and the "tortoise" syndrome amongst non-technocratic, non-monopoly elements in the civil service. Secondly, the rise of mass-based popular organisations committed to establishing participatory democracy at the grassroots level seriously restricted the UF's ability to move into an area, establish a target constituency and attempt to improve their "quality of life" without addressing the underlying structural causes of the problem.

Indeed, the Urban Foundation is now "enmeshed in the extraordinarily complex set of deep-rooted antagonisms and conflicts which traverse the entire social fabric" of the social formation.

The way that the Urban Foundation has attempted to extricate itself from this predicament has been a very sophisticated attempt to attach itself to sections of the peripheral elite of the democratic movement, sectors that nonetheless are opinion-formers in the townships and have some potential of delivering their constituency. These "leaders" the UF has attempted to bring into an alliance with monopoly capital in discussions around economic blueprints for the future - these highly secretive discussions aimed no doubt at carving

and sixthly - the creation "of one or more coalitions with sufficient political strength to ensure the enactment and implementation of reforms".

Huntington included as potential recruits to such a coalition "the leaders of the Coloured and Asian communities, urban middle-class blacks, traditional Black leaders, and, externally, the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom."

In terms of the sequence of reforms, Huntington discusses the relative effects of three broad types of reforms (Dismantling apartheid, Economic benefits, Political representation) on, successively; probable white resistance, principal black beneficiaries; and in terms of their impact on black impatience.

He argues that the optimum first reform that should be embarked on is that of 'dismantling apartheid'.

Unfortunately he does not qualify what this term implies. If he means the scrapping of all discriminatory legislation, he is in fact talking about altering the form of state from a two-faced Janus to a bourgeois democracy.

He is proposing a reform coalition across the cleavage of the dominant contradiction, in order to alter the form of state without changing the basic structure of power relations!

If we accept the CST thesis this proposal is obviously ludicrous. However this is, in essence, what Total Strategy amounted to: a restructuring of the composition of the ruling bloc, under the technocratic dominance of the military and monopoly capital, the restructuring of the form of regime along lines of the Western "military-industrial complex", and an overt attempt at subverting the unity of the oppressed classes through blurring the edges of the dominant contradiction, the de-racialisation of national oppression.

As Mao put it: "... in the contradiction between theory and practice, practice is the principal aspect"(31)

It is only in practice that we can test the correctness of a theory. Most of the remainder of this paper is devoted to an assessment of the success of the ruling bloc's attempts at winning over the "black middle classes" and their potential in terms of the prosecution of national-democratic struggle.

(31) in "On Contradiction" p294

4. CST is challenged - recent materialist writing on NAFCOC

Since the resurgence of historical materialist analysis in South Africa and its application to the social formation, the notion of "Colonialism of a Special Type" has consistently been attacked by local revisionists, most of them academics and many linked to the nascent labour movement.

These theorists have argued from a number of different angles that CST is an outdated framework that is inapplicable to the present highly-developed capitalist society and cannot account for or accomodate the development of monopoly capitalist relations of production, urbanisation and the rapidly growing class-consciousness of the urban proletariat.

When most conciliatory, these critiques suggest a revision of CST that is more in line with current conditions - at worst they infer that the application of CST to political practice is tantamount to selling the workers' struggle down the river.

Two recent and similar interventions continue this challenge to the relevance of CST. Both are directly relevant to our discussion on the position of the "Black middle classes" since both are directly concerned with NAFCOC.

In "Class interests and politics: the case of the urban African bourgeoisie", Peter Hudson and Mike Sarakinsky acknowledge that

"neither the political identity of a group nor the political alliances it forms can be immediately deduced from its class identity". They state further that "class interests and demands are always shaped by the specific conditions obtaining at a given moment in a society". It is unfortunate that the authors then fail to analyse or even suggest what the specific conditions are in South African society that influence the political position of a class or class-fraction. (Hudson and Sarakinsky 1986:170)

They resort merely to listing a series of examples of interventions and initiatives of state and capital aimed specifically at easing the restrictions on the African capitalist class. This is done in order to indicate the changed relationship between the African middle classes and the ruling bloc, a relationship that they argue has benefitted the class and which is likely to continue benefitting them in the future.

"Increasingly it appears that the apartheid state is capable of absorbing the demands of the urban African bourgeoisie, and that it is possible for this class to grow both in size and power within the parameters of apartheid."

This, for our authors, appears to vindicate the position that

"... it is chimerical to continue proposing, and hoping to see established, an alliance of all 'nationally oppressed' classes which has as its aim the overthrow of apartheid." (Hudson and Sarakinsky 1986:182)

My main criticisms centre on what has been omitted or assumed in this paper. Firstly, they fail to attempt to analyse the "specific conditions" they refer to as influencing the political position of a class. If they had done this, looking at both subjective and objective conditions in society (ie. both at the overall structure of

relations of domination and subordination as well as the organisational and mass dynamics in that society) they would have at least had a basis to ground their opinion in.

Secondly, they unproblematically assume that state and capital have in fact achieved exactly what they set out to, without analysing to what extent such initiatives have been blocked, either by lower level intransigence amongst civil servants or corporate managerial strata, or by organised opposition on the part of the masses.

Thirdly, they seek to deny any agency on the part of the 'urban African bourgeoisie', seeing it rather like iron filings drawn irresistibly towards an electromagnet when the Reform Dynamo is galvanised. They ignore other forces and pressures acting on the class, and fail to inquire from the horse's mouth why particular options were chosen and what the alternatives were.

The second intervention we need to look at is "The ideology and politics of African capitalists"(31) in which Mike Sarakinsky attempts to examine "how in fact African capitalists have defined their interests and political strategies", these strategies being "aimed at the state, white capital and all Africans".

NAFCOC's political discourse has 'two strands' according to Sarakinsky: firstly a "reformist appeal to white capital and the state", emphasising the benefits of the emergence of a 'black middle class'; secondly an appeal to 'racial identity' in an attempt to

(32) Paper no. 54 17th Annual ASSA Congress June 30-July 4 1986

project the interests of African entrepreneurs as common to all Africans.

Sarakinsky thus attempts to paint a picture of NAFCOC's relationship with the state as that of a grouping of 'Uncle Toms' engaged in "conciliatory reformism" under the tutelage of monopoly capital. While he mentions examples of the conflict between NAFCOC and white capital over penetration of the Black market, he shrugs this off as a minor contradiction compared to the dependence relationship fostered by white capital.

NAFCOC's participation in bantustan and local government structures is seen by Sarakinsky as opportunism in order to "further their sectional interests".

Sarakinsky sees the relationship between NAFCOC and the Black community principally in terms of its attempts to assert its leadership over that community. Although he correctly points out that NAFCOC has attempted to harness the power of the community to further the interests of the class it represents, he fails to analyse how the urban African community has responded. This is particularly strange in a period of mass schools boycotts, consumer boycotts, the collapse of black local authorities and the destruction of many black businesses.

The escalation of demands by NAFCOC witnessed in the recent period are dismissed as "apparent "radicalisation"" in order merely to

enhance its credibility amongst blacks. He remarks that NAFCOC is careful "to ensure that its radicalisation does not overstep the mark defined by white capital".

In conclusion, Sarakinsky states that NAFCOC's political program consists of a "concerted attempt to win allies over to its own reformist cause", and that the "promotion of the leading role of the working class requires that the ideological terrain not be conceded to NAFCOC". To Sarakinsky, asserting "the essential unity of all black classes on racial grounds" would mean such a concession.

Two broad criticisms of Sarakinsky's position will do for now. Firstly, Sarakinsky again fails to identify relations of domination in broader society, or investigate the concrete effect of national oppression on the Black middle class. This omission places him quite firmly amongst those who continue to apply an academic and unmediated class analysis to the South African situation. This is unfortunate, because it leads on to the conclusion (erroneous I believe) that the interests of the African bourgeoisie are not only the same as those of monopoly capital economically (which is quite clearly not true) but also politically (in terms of the need to suppress combativity of the working class)

Secondly, he identifies NAFCOC with the grouping it represents. It is undeniable that the leadership of NAFCOC has been associated with a conciliatory approach and a political conservatism in the past. However more recently this leadership has come under severe pressure

from its membership to take political action further than mouthings. Moreover, Sarakinsky does not look at the contribution of traders (many of them NAFCOC members) at the level of the townships, nor the considerable pressure that these traders are under both from the masses as consumers and from mass-based organisations. He sees the struggle for hegemony in the struggle only in terms of the middle class and seems to lack confidence in the power of popular mass-based organisations to assert leadership over the small Black middle class.

5. NAFCOC and its recent history

5a. NAFCOC the organisation

NAFCOC (the National African Federated Chambers of Commerce) evolved out of the National African Chamber of Commerce (NACOC) which was established after of a conference in Orlando in 1964. The change in name resulted from the reorganisation along regional lines which took place in 1969, after conflict with the Government over its demand for separate ethnic organisation.

NAFCOC's objectives have been articulated as:

"1. To promote a spirit of co-operation and unity among Black businessmen in Southern Africa.

"2. To mobilise the Black community towards self-help and full participation in the economy of Southern Africa.

"3. To further the development of the Black business community by sponsoring needed industrial, commercial and agricultural projects, collating and disseminating information on business matters, awarding scholarships, and organising special training courses and seminars for businessmen.

"4. To protect the rights and interests of Blacks in business by opposing measures which directly or indirectly obstruct their progress.

"5. To serve as the sole body representing Black business interests nationally." (NAFCOC Five-Year Plan 1985-1990)

While NAFCOC has sought recognition as a chamber representing Black commerce, it is clear that there are significant distinctions between NAFCOC and institutions such as Assocom and the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI), not least of which is the role that NAFCOC has played in the training and nurturing of entrepreneurial skills amongst blacks, and the struggle against the legislative and

political discrimination against Blacks in the economy. While any organisation of a particular grouping or stratum will represent the common interests of that stratum, few organisations of the capitalist or aspirant-capitalist class have been forced to shoulder as much as NAFCOC, in terms of functions normally the responsibility of the capitalist state or civil society more broadly. This is due directly to the structural exclusion of Black agents from access to political and economic power, particularly in terms of the redistributive role of the capitalist state and its ability to intervene in the reproduction or accumulation of a particular class.

Thus NAFCOC has many different facets, not all related to its nominal role as a "chamber of commerce", but all relevant to its attempts to carve a niche for the aspirant African capitalist class in the South African economy. These include: the production of a monthly magazine, African Business; the initiation and development of the African Bank; the initiation of a "Masekela-Mavimbela Scholarship Fund which this year (1985) will sponsor 100 students mainly for Commercial and Industrial Training at various Southern African Universities and Technikons"; the establishment of the African Development and Construction Company; Blackchain retail chain; NAFCOC Via Travel Agency; and other funds, such as life assurance companies and development corporations. NAFCOC's "special Committees" deal with areas as diverse as Education, Transport and Legal, Strategy and Planning.

NAFCOC's structures reflect its federal nature. 18 regions, many of them coterminous with the bantustans, have their own regional

chambers, most of which have local affiliates in the various townships or centres. The regional chambers delegate members to NAFCOC National Executive Council, which meets every two years. Sub-committees of the council (of which there are six: Management, Finance, Legal, Strategy, Transport and President's) meet more regularly and present reports to NAFCOC annual conference, supposedly the supreme decision-making forum. The NAFCOC secretariat consists of employees of NAFCOC and is based at NAFCOC head office in Garankuwa, in KwaNdebele.

As in any organisation, the locus of power cannot merely be read off from the constitution. In NAFCOC participatory democracy is hardly encouraged, and while conference provides the space for the rank-and-file membership to express themselves, and is an important occasion for leadership to gather information and assert itself publicly, it would be true to say that policy is decided for the most part behind closed doors in the many and varied committees (both sub- and Special). These structures are overwhelmingly dominated by the "Old Guard": names that have been prominent in NAFCOC since it was founded, many of them closely linked to Bantustan structures. Also evident in all of the Special committees are representatives of "white capital" who due to their expertise and training exercise a disproportionate influence on the direction of the organisation.

Thus not only has NAFCOC in the past been distant from the direct experience of its membership in the townships, it has tended towards exclusivism away from the working masses, seeking rather a rapprochement with white capital as an entree into the economy. While

this is illogical in terms of the class aspirations of the dominant groupings in NAFCOC, it ignored the extent to which the trading and entrepreneurial class could be held accountable to the community as a whole through social, historical bonds and proximity. It was bound to come into conflict with the aims and practices of democratic organisations.

NAFCOC's aim to represent the black trading and business class nationally is unchallenged (other organisations such as the National Taverners Association and South African Black Taxi Association are occupation-specific but enjoy close links with NAFCOC), and the organisation is treated as such by both capital and the state. While the organisation can point to only "around 10 300" paid-up members, an executive spokesperson pointed out that associates and "friends" could bump up support to "around 30 000" (33). This is out of a stratum of African entrepreneurs estimated by the Economic Affairs Committee of the President's Council to number 100 340 in 1980 (34). NAFCOC includes several "Indian" traders as members in Natal and the Transvaal, and UNICOC, the "coloured" chamber of Commerce on the Rand is an affiliate.

The breakdown of NAFCOC members by occupation is instructive. Out of a representative sample of 5280 NAFCOC members (see Appendix 1) 4772 could be classed as retailers or general dealers (ie. a low level of capital necessary to initiate the business, at the same time a high degree of vulnerability to consumer power as well as

(33) Financial Mail July 8 1983

(34) Race Relations Survey 1984 p224

recession), 146 as "skilled independents" such as tailors or builders, and 362 as white collar entrepreneurs including professionals, consultants and opticians (post-secondary education, at one remove from township economy).

This would indicate that over 90% of NAFCDC membership is based on the periphery of the economy, that very few are in fact owners of the means of production and most very vulnerable both to competition from white retail firms and to vagaries of the economy. The overwhelming majority have day-to-day contact with the masses as consumers and are vulnerable to their withholding trade or other organised or spontaneous action.

Although the small size of the constituency that NAFCDC represents formally and the imperfect and contradictory manner in which it presents their interests militate against the organisation being a coherent political force, it has none the less been an important political and ideological symbol contested over by organisations and forces of both right and left. This is mainly because of its ideological and symbolic value as a representative of the 'silent majority', the "Black moderates" which the state and capital have been anxiously courting, particularly since the onset of Total Strategy.

NAFCDC does generally enjoy a degree of legitimacy amongst sectors in the townships, particularly the older generations as well as aspirant petty-bourgeois elements, who not only regard NAFCDC as more independent and more challenging to the regime than other so-called "moderate leaders" but are impressed with the economic progress made

by Africans in NAFCOC: they represent for the aspirants the fact that "you can make it!".

5b. NAFCOC's recent history: a case of log-rolling

It is as difficult to extract an objective interpretation of NAFCOC's history as it is to get academics to agree on the role of the middle classes. Within NAFCOC itself there are widely divergent opinions regarding the recent past.

Mashudu Ramano, features editor of African Business, the official mouthpiece of NAFCOC, saw the organisation as part and parcel of the broad Black Consciousness Movement in the early 1970's, and as such it was concerned to build Black unity and make demands on the state for the lifting of restrictions. However he sees a turning point in the wake of the 1976 uprising and the formation of the Urban Foundation, when the leadership of NAFCOC decided to participate in the structures set up to develop the "Black middle class".

The older generation "believed that Whites in general were interested in real fundamental change - they felt that big business was genuine". The late 70's and early 80's, according to Ramano, were characterised by political quiescence and conservatism on the part of the leadership. This lasted until they "realised as years went by that the Urban Foundation could not commit itself and was not accepted - because of its patronising attitude". (Personal Interview 16.1.87)

In contradiction to this interpretation, the President of NAFCOC, Dr S M Motsuenyane - the major figure in the leadership hierarchy that Ramano is critical of - sees the recent political impatience of NAFCOC statements as nothing out of the ordinary, in fact in continuity with NAFCOC's history:

"If you read our speeches you will see that we have never really been tolerant. The Press has suddenly discovered NAFCOCbut for all my years as President we've been just as critical of the Government and we've held meetings with them at the highest level to tell them.." (Personal Interview 23.1.87)

Ethnic Commerce

Motsuenyane likes to recall, as an example of NAFCOC standing up to Government, the conflict of 1969 over the demand from the state that NAFCOC reorganise along ethnic lines.

"NAFCOC was courageous enough not to do that....M C Botha refused to talk to us - for seven years they refused to talk to us.... That is part of our history!" (Personal Interview 23.1.87)

This highly romantic rendition of the conflict is common to NAFCOC literature. In 1976 Motsuenyane spoke of "the consensus viewpoint that breaking NAFCOC into ethnic components would certainly kill the organisation, and the spirit that made the organisation" (35)

What is not so often mentioned is the pseudo-compromise decision reached that NAFCOC would establish regional chambers of commerce. The pragmatism of the decision is revealed in the following, an excerpt from the Presidential Address given in 1970:

(35) see NAFCOC: "Path To Progress: a Black Perspective on Economic Development"; Johannesburg 1980, p8

"The idea of establishing regional chambers was accepted ... as an attempt to meet the Deputy Minister's proposal in part: as a means of attaining a more effective organisation of our provincial chambers; and also to facilitate co-operation of our organisation with the recently constituted territorial authorities throughout the republic." (36)

An important sector of NAFCOC's membership has always been sited in the bantustans. Although not as vocal nor as economically muscular as the Rand Chambers of Commerce, they have always been an important conservative counterweight to the impatience of the urban traders and entrepreneurs. In these areas, the relationship between NAFCOC and the bantustan governments has been important for both parties.

NAFCOC and the bantustans

The intensification of Apartheid controls in the 1950's included increasing restrictions on the African traders in the urban areas as the state prepared to rid "White South Africa" of permanent black communities. The corollary of this approach was official assistance and patronage of the Black commercial and trading class, mostly through the medium of the various Development Corporations.

Thus the Act that transferred the Ciskei National Development Corporation to the Ciskei government identified one of the objects of

(36) Motsuenyane: Presidential Address, Sixth Annual Conference to the National African Chamber of Commerce May 23 1970; quoted in Van de Merwe, H et al eds.: "African Perspectives on South Africa"; Cape Town 1978

the CNDC as "the development of Ciskeian citizens as entrepreneurs and thus to create a strong middle class". (37)

This role has however not been unproblematic for the major promoters of the Development Corporations - the state and white capital (predominantly Afrikaner capital and parastatals). The imperatives of white capital have centred clearly on extracting the maximum economic surplus from the decentralisation strategy. The state's needs have merely been the creation and reproduction of an economic base for the bantustan regimes. The articulation of these imperatives have often been in contradiction with the desire of an aspirant commercial bourgeoisie for autonomy and economic space.

Thus there have been instances of resistance from NAFCOC to competition from white capital, as well as indications that NAFCOC has at times not been satisfied with the quality of leadership in the bantustans.

The "tripartite system" in which Black business was to enter a three-way partnership with the government corporations and white capital in industrial enterprises was severely criticised at times:

"We think it will bring elements of White domination into the homelands and we are tired of any form of domination, we are not going to allow it..."
(Motsuenyane 1976) (38)

Similarly the role of the Bantu Investment Corporation was seen as unproductive:

(37) in Hirsch, A: "Industrialization in the Ciskei"; MA thesis UCT 1982, p159

(38) in "Path to Progress" p9

"...insofar as providing funds,...it has done its best....But when we come to the question of creating the Black man, building him up, putting him into a position where he could, after 17 years, be trained to do what the BIC is trying to do today, when it comes to that I am sorry to say that ...it has lamentably failed." (SJJ Lesolang of NAFCOC) (39)

NAFCOC was critical also of the state's use of yes-men African businessmen as token representatives of their interests on bantustan structures:

"...Development Boards are usually stocked with politically sympathetic businessmen, not necessarily businessmen who are competent to make a contribution at that level." (Motsuenyane 1976)

And again in 1978:

"Some of our members have been elected to serve on the boards via the party in some areas. They have not been the best people that we know, they have been people very much inside the party framework, people that we certainly wouldn't recommend..." (Motsuenyane 1978) (40)

In some cases bantustan governments have put pressure on their chambers of commerce to secede from NAFCOC, because of the threat it poses both to their local legitimacy and their claim to be independent. (41) At the 1980 national conference it was revealed that NAFCOC's branches operating in the homelands were being "harassed" by homeland governments. President Mangope, who opened the conference, stated that his government would recognise the Bophuthatswana Chamber of Commerce (BOCOC). (42)

(39) in "Path to Progress" p19

(40) ibid p 27

(41) Southall, R: "African Capitalism in Contemporary South Africa" JSAS vol7 no 1 1980, p67

(42) 1980 Race Relations Survey p130

While NAFEDC strongly asserted its independence ("We do not want to be another party, or part of another party ...this is one of the conditions being imposed on NAFEDC in some areas in order for it to be persona grata with the government" - Motsuenyane 1978) (43), it also stressed the importance of neutrality in homeland squabbles.

NAFEDC has undoubtedly co-operated with the bantustan system insofar as the bantustans have provided an important economic base for the nurturing and reproduction of a commercial petty-bourgeoisie. However it is clear that NAFEDC has in the past fended off and will in the future react strongly against any attempt to deprive the urban black population of its permanence, or to assert that the political rights of urban Blacks are to be exercised in the bantustans.

When in May 1976 the lifting of restrictions on urban traders had as a prerequisite their acquisition of homeland citizenship certificates, ie. a renunciation of their claims to urban permanence, NAFEDC reacted strongly, both itself lambasting the government for its "treachery" and mobilising support from white capital. (44) In the face of this broad opposition, and in the wake of the Soweto uprising, the state dropped this requirement and began to recognise the needs of urban traders and NAFEDC as their representative.

NAFEDC, the Community Councils and township politics

(43) in "Path to Progress" p27

(44) in Keeble, S: "A history of NAFEDC 1960-1980"; Unpublished MA thesis, Wits 1982 p 362

Just as the bantustan structures provided protection and assistance and access to capital and opportunities for the aspirant commercial bourgeoisie, so too have the structures of urban representation meant for the state a chance to establish patronage systems ultimately dependent on the state for reproduction and accumulation. The state has in essence attempted to duplicate the "indirect rule" of the bantustans in the urban areas, to establish a subservient commercial class similar to that in the bantustans.

After the meeting with NAFCOC after Soweto, the Government sent a directive to all local Bantu Administration offices to work in close consultation with NAFCOC branches on business matters. However NAFCOC was not satisfied with the nature of consultation and urged the state "...to extend to Blacks the right to participate in and determine an appropriate system of local administration in the urban areas..." (Keeble 1982:339)

The system which resulted (established by the Community Councils Act of July 1977) was received without rejoicing by NAFCOC. Not only did the new Community Councils have limited powers (as few in fact as the smouldering Urban Bantu Councils) but Black opinion was not canvassed when the Councils machinery was conceptualised. Moreover, the Councils were still tainted by references to ethnic distinctions, which at this stage was bound to condemn any proposal in the eyes of the Black community.

Gradually, as the state forged ahead with the Councils system and attempted to lure participants in the face of community indifference and resistance, NAFCOC members began to see benefits in

participation. The Black Local Authorities Act of 1983 upgraded community councils to township or village councils, which were to be self-financing autonomous local authorities. The major reason for the shift in attitude towards the system seems to be the powers that were transferred in terms of the Black Local Authorities Act to the Councils from the Administration Boards, particularly those related to licensing and allocation of business sites (Keeble 1982:342)

Most businessmen who joined the Councils saw them as a vehicle for improving the lot of African business in the various areas. For many this decision was clothed in righteous terms of representing their constituencies, or in terms of a

"...commitment to incremental and ameliorative change in township living conditions coupled with the belief that their participation might also secure political change at a wider, national level" (45)

Thus Steve Kgame, president of the Urban Councils Association of South Africa (UCASA):

"...we can effectively start by using the existing councils as agents of development...for real and meaningful negotiation between the black masses and the central government in whom we find so many mistakes.." (ibid)

The Black petit-bourgeoisie are proportionately overrepresented on the Community Councils, and the following example from Tumahole in the OFS seems typical: the eight councillors elected in the first spate of elections under the Local Authorities (1983-84) included a school principal, a nurse, a computer operator, a skilled machine operator, a multi-outlet trader and a taxi operator. While only the

(45) in Humphries, R: "Life after death?: Legitimacy and Black local government"; unpublished working document, Department of Development Administration and Politics, University of South Africa (1985) p4

last two are unambiguously aspirant-bourgeois. five of the others enjoy a formal income massive in relation to the mass of residents and are quite possibly on the verge of launching into petty accumulation themselves. (46)

The real reason for the enthusiasm amongst businessmen and aspirant petty accumulators for participation in the Councils lies in the potential for patronage and the creation of a political powerbase within the township community. It seems that council members are often put up for the job by businessmen who remain in the background, enjoying a symbiotic relationship with their "connections" on the councils. In return for the granting of licenses and the provision of inside information, the council member obtains "favours" in cash or kind.

An example from the Vaal Triangle bears this out:

"Mr Kosilang [a councillor in opposition to the ruling bloc on the Vaal council] said that when a business was advertised for occupation, the 'favoured people knew in advance of the official announcement that they had been granted licenses. They openly boasted about it and to prove their point they would immediately throw braaivleis parties for the executive member of the council" (47)

The patronage network, although given a boost by the councils system, had arisen out of the political vacuum in the townships in the 60's and after the Soweto uprising. Into this vacuum has stepped a stratum of petty accumulators, characterised by Seekings (Seekings

(46) Seekings, J: "Reform, repression and the changing political terrain in South Africa's black townships"; paper presented to ROAPE - Centre of African Studies Conference on 'Popular struggles in Africa', September 1986, University of Liverpool

(47) in Nusas: "Ruling the townships" Cape Town 1985 p6

1986:3) as "lumpen-capitalist", who have attempted to establish an alternative hierarchy and power base to that of the popular mass-based tradition. This patronage network or web is rooted in strata such as the shebeen-owners, retailers, nurses and teachers, strata with a relative autonomy from the mainstream economy and the ability to extract surplus from the interstices of the township economy, through both formal and informal sectors. They also have links with the lumpenproletariat and its underworld. Their interests lie for the most part in the status quo, and they have tended to resist any initiative that threatens to rock the boat.

This web, although tenacious and ubiquitous, has a fragile nature and its hold on the townships has been severely challenged by the mass resistance to the Community Councils system and their collapse nationally in the period from May 1984 onwards, and by the rise of mass-based organisations promoting participatory democracy, non-collaboration with the apartheid state and accountability of all to the community.

NAFCOC members and the local chambers as a whole have been linked closely to the unrepresentative councils system, (Humphries 1985:17) and have clearly been tied in to the "patronage network" in various ways. While the response of several sectors of the aspirant-bourgeois stratum has been to identify with the "security forces" and their attempts to restore 'law and order', sometimes in an organised form as vigilantes; others have sought, in the context of an approach by community organisations of ensuring the "maximum unity of the oppressed", to support the initiatives and campaigns of democratic

organisations. NAFCCOC as a whole has had to define a position which would best serve its interests, both long and short-term, as well as alleviate the pressure placed on it by its many 'constituencies'.

NAFCOC and the opening up of the market

As mentioned above, one of the first deviations from grand apartheid initiated by the state in the "Total Strategy" period was the lifting of restrictions on the entry of white capital into Black townships. This has on numerous occasions aroused the virulent opposition of NAFCCOC nationally and many local chambers, exposing the contradiction between the interests of white capital and those of "Black capital", which the handy phrase "interests of free enterprise" could not paper over.

Resistance to the untrammelled entry of white capital led to the requirement by the Department of Co-operation and Development that the penetration by white capital be on the basis of a 49% holding, the rest belonging to African businessmen. NAFCCOC's attitude to this was clearly negative:

"....until Blacks are allowed to trade freely in S A and all existing barriers impeding their participation in the country's economy are removed, it is altogether unfair and morally unsound for white businessmen to be allowed wholesale and unconditional entry into the Black areas". (Motsuenyane - Presidential Address 1978) (48)

For the next two years NAFCCOC and many regional affiliates resisted the penetration by white companies. However many individual traders broke ranks and entered partnerships against NAFCCOC policy. At the

(48) in 1978 Race Relations Survey p223

National Executive Council of January 1980. NAFCOC yielded, accepting African/white partnerships under certain conditions. These included:

- * that all discriminatory regulations and policies affecting Africans in the economy be repealed as soon as possible;

- * that African businessmen trading in African areas be protected against unfair competition from white businessmen;

- * that partnerships should not be imposed on Africans, but left to emerge naturally;

- * that as far as possible, business partnerships should be free from government participation;

- * that the primary objective in any partnership venture in African areas should be to maximise benefits to Africans. Partnerships should not always be thought of in terms of African and white;

- * African/white partnerships should be fairly extended to both African and white markets. (49)

Often white capital, impatient to get at the Black market and attempting to avoid the legal wrangles launched against many companies by NAFCOC and its affiliates, used willing black businessmen as 'fronts' for its own enterprises. NAFCOC and its regional bodies, especially in Soweto where the Soweto Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SOCOC) was under stiff competition from front companies, campaigned against the 'fronts' as well as the equally damaging 49-51% arrangement. SOCOC sent a telegram to the Minister of Co-operation and Development saying that they

"oppose the 49%-51% scheme for businesses. We believe the scheme will destroy the livelihood of

thousands of Soweto traders. We urge you not to do anything to further advance the scheme, pending representation" (50)

In 1981 NAFCOC affiliates objected to the 49-51 scheme in Soweto, in Port Elizabeth and in Bophuthatswana (51) . However, the issue of participation in such partnerships really blew up in 1983. In mid-year several prominent NAFCOC members gave evidence before the Economic Affairs Committee of the President's Council, to the effect that the practice of partnerships disguised the fact that independent businessmen could not compete with the better-financed and more expert partnerships. At the time, a remark by David Thebehali ('mayor' of Soweto) that some of these people had themselves entered into partnerships went unnoticed (52) . In November NAFCOC was forced to call for a boycott of the newly formed company Afrimet Ltd, a partnership between African traders and Metro Cash and Carry established on a 51-49% basis. This partnership carried extra sting for NAFCOC and its policy since the Afrimet compny was in direct competition with the NAFCOC retail chain, Blackchain and had in fact obtained two trading sites that Blackchain had bid for. Further confusing the issue was the fact that several NAFCOC members, including Vela Kraai (chair of SOCOC), who had given evidence to the Economic Affairs Committee, were centrally involved in the partnership.

(50) in 1980 Race Relations Survey p129

(51) in 1981 Race Relations Survey p 163

(52) in 1983 Race Relations Survey p291

With very few traders needing the boycott call, and offers pouring in from black shareholders, NAFDOC was forced to take drastic action to indicate its displeasure at being ignored. Four of the participants (Messrs. Kraai, Mabonya, Pooe and Mashile) were expelled from the Southern Transvaal Chamber of Commerce for their part in Afrimet.

The basis for NAFDOC's objection was not all founded on moral principles. Motsuenyane admitted to the Financial Mail that a major spur to the boycott was the threat that Afrimet posed to Blackchain, and did not hesitate to defend the partnership between Roberts Construction and the NAFDOC subsidiary African Development and Construction Company.

"This is a highly specialised, sophisticated area - it's in retailing that we totally oppose white involvement of any kind." (53)

The upshot of the Afrimet affair was that Metro withdrew from Afrimet, leaving the R490 000 investment in Afrimet in the hands of the African directors as a loan repayable over five years. While Metro would continue to give management support to Afrimet, this would end after five instead of the original 20 years. The number of white directors was dropped from four to two to serve in an advisory capacity only.

The Metro MD admitted they had learnt a lesson -

"If you want to do business in African areas, let Africans do it. Metro went in with the best of intentions and got their fingers burnt". (54)

(53) Financial Mail November 1983

(54) in 1984 Race Relations Survey p 224

The problem of 'fronts' and NAFDOC's resistance to them, has continued till today. NAFDOC hopes that the idea and practise of franchises will put an end to the fronts, (55) but it is far more likely that the interests of eager white businessmen will prevail.

The ADCC - Roberts connection has, predictably, not been plain sailing for NAFDOC. Much of an article in the African Business of August 1986 was devoted to defending the involvement of ADCC's holding company ADCH in the leasing and marketing of a large shopping centre at Midway railway station south east of Soweto. Since the centre was technically outside the Soweto boundary, it escaped the prohibition on 51-49 partnerships. However, the threat this posed to retailers in the township itself resulted in an unprecedented motion of protest from the Soweto Chamber of Commerce :

"i) We reject the paternalistic and prescriptive manner in which the project was conducted and introduced to local business whereby local business is being invited to participate in an already 'cooked' scheme.

"ii) Whilst the creation of a non-racial, democratic South Africa is delayed, the encroachment of big business in black areas on any terms should be discouraged. As normal economic partnership in a politically abnormal South Africa is nonsensical we reject this project.

"iii) We view the project as premature at this point because whilst the present political/economic dispensation prevails, no normal economic black and white partnership can be in favour of black participation." (56)

It is terms such as the above which make it difficult to talk unproblematically in terms of a coalescence of interests between white capital and the Black aspirant bourgeoisie.

(55) Financial Mail August 17 1984

(56) African Business vol13 no10

The structure and practise of white capital is highly monopolised, with access to the financial muscle and technical resources of the sophisticated and competitive Rand economy, and of the international financing world, and can count on the co-operation of the bureaucracy and legislature of the apartheid state (which was erected historically as an adjunct of capital).

The aspirant black bourgeoisie has no such muscle behind it. Its historical roots are in the informal sector and petty-commodity producing stratum of the proletarianised masses. It has never had access to the educational, financial or technical resources available to its white counterparts, and in fact remains legislatively and de facto barred from access to these facilities. In the present political economy, it cannot compete on any level with white capital, as the above quote makes clear.

While periods of 'mini-boom' (eg. 1978-80) might witness white capital making gestures of largesse towards black business, these spates of patronage do not encourage the self-determination of the aspirant bourgeoisie but (as the recipients themselves are well aware and resent) merely foster dependence. As the structural economic crisis worsens, white capital is forced, in order to 'survive' (ie. maintain historic rates of accumulation), to penetrate the Black Market, shouldering undercapitalised Black businesses aside in the process.

NAFCOC and the state

Although NAFCOC leadership claim that NAFCOC was refused audience from 1969 until 1976, the Government was accessible to the Chamber's approaches and requests from 1973 onwards. The main tenor of these depositions centred on the questions of the permanency of urban Blacks and the repeal of discriminatory legislation. While no official meeting took place in this period, the state did receive notification of NAFCOC's concerns via delegations of homeland leaders, and in January 1975 announced a number of concessions to urban Blacks. These concessions removed restrictions imposed in 1963 and allowed Africans to own business premises. The number of commodities Africans could trade in was increased. When finally promulgated, these regulations were however linked to the acquisition by the trader of a homeland citizenship certificate.

As mentioned above, this requirement was dropped after mobilisation by NAFCOC who gained support from big business. However the major factor prompting a government rethink was the intervention of the Soweto riots. On 20 August 1976 the first NAFCOC delegation to see the Government since 1968 was admitted to see the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration. The Deputy Minister agreed to drop the homeland citizenship requirement, to urge all Bantu Administration Boards to consult with NAFCOC's local and regional chambers on all matters affecting black business interests, as well as to meet with the NAFCOC executive annually.

More concessions followed a follow-up meeting in August 1977. The size of business sites was increased from 150 to 350 square metres, while more importantly the Government increased the number of business activities open to African capital.

However the feeling was still that the reforms had not gone far enough, and NAFCOC's requests in September 1978 included the abolition of the BAAB's monopoly of the liquor and hotel trade (a major source of the Boards' finance), facilitation of African participation in industry and the revision of the discriminatory tax structure embodied in the Black Taxation Act.

The major point of contention in the 1980-81 period was the unequal competition between Black and white business, manifested particularly in the controversy over the 49-51 scheme. Although government refused to come down on the side of NAFCOC, leaving the organisation to fight its own battle with monopoly capital (with some success - see above) the state did support the establishment of the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC), the financing for which came predominantly from the private sector. The aims of the SBDC included:

- " * the promotion of private enterprise among all population groups in Southern Africa;
- * the financing of small business by providing share and loan capital on a short, medium and long-term basis;
- * the underwriting of loans granted by the private banking sector to their own enterprising small-business clients" (57)

While this was welcomed by NAFCOC, the organisation warned that if the African entrepreneur was to make any progress, the lack of

(57) in 1981 Race Relations Survey p164

capital, unsuitable premises and bureaucratic restrictions should be seriously examined by the state.(58) In a similar vein, the executive council was instructed by the 1982 annual conference to negotiate with the government the repeal of the Land Tenure Acts of 1913 and 1936. The executive was also urged to resume negotiation on the question of opening of CBDs through legislation and "not by a series of permits involving municipalities and government agencies".(59)

In 1983 the same themes were repeated in more strident tones. In the Presidential address to NAFCOC, Motsuenyane called for the immediate scrapping of the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 and the Group Areas act of 1950. Anger was expressed that government had ignored repeated calls for the opening up of the CBDs, and at the response of Minister Koornhof to the calls. Koornhof had stated that white institutions were allowed into African areas with the "sole purpose of providing needed facilities to Africans". Such assistance by Africans in white areas was not required, according to the honourable Minister.

1984 saw NAFCOC taking up the issue of populations removals, arguing that they were "not only undemocratic and inhuman, but also the greatest cause of community disruption, unrest and poverty". NAFCOC conference mandated the executive to persuade the government to allow blacks tenure in all parts of the country.(60)

(58) in 1982 Race Relations Survey p127

(59) ibid p128

(60) 1984 Race Relations Survey p226

The scale of demands on the Government escalated again in 1985. Motsuenyane called for the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and all political prisoners, the unbanning of the ANC and PAC in order to initiate a peaceful dialogue with them and other relevant political organisations in the country. Calls were also made for the government to :

- * grant full citizenship to all South Africans irrespective of their race;

- * scrap all discriminatory legislation against black people including such laws as the Black Urban Areas Act, the GAA, the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936; the population Registration Act of 1950, the Separate Amenities Act etc. (sic);

- * open all public schools and tertiary institutions to all races

- * announce intent to dismantle apartheid

- * open business opportunities for all races everywhere and abolish social and residential segregation (Presidential Address, African Business July 1985)

While NAFCOC, in a joint statement with the FCI, Assocom, Seifsa, the AHI and the Chamber of Mines expressed support for the reforms announced by PW Botha at the beginning of the 1985 session, Motsuenyane spoke of the gap between rhetoric and reality:

"Although the Government is speaking a language of reform nowadays, it is disheartening to observe the widening gap that exists between the rhetoric of Government on the one hand, and what happens in reality at the bottom level of officialdom.

"Until the reformist spirit of Government permeates into the lower strata of administration, where the problems actually occur, there can be no justified change of attitude on the part of Blacks resulting from promises made by Government leaders" (African Business July 1985)

This passage seems to capture the essence of the relationship between NAFCOC and the state. Commentators have pointed to the high level of dependence of Black business on the state and capital to conclude that this stratum is also tied politically to reform. This I believe is an assumption that is not borne out in practise. It negates the political independence and agency of the aspirant bourgeoisie, and underestimates the integrity of this stratum in pursuing what are admittedly class interests. These commentators assume that the class interests of the aspirant Black bourgeoisie can be realised within the present form of state. They also identify the reasons for the pursuance of reform by Black business (the furthering and strengthening of its class position) with the reasons of monopoly capital (restoring the rate of profit in the dominant sectors of the economy while attempting to stabilise the status quo).

An accurate view of the period we have dealt with (roughly the mid 70's and the early 80's) would see the lukewarm support of NAFCOC for the regime as continually re-purchased by the state and capital through grants and concessions. The Government has continually had to weigh up its interests in developing a "Black middle class" against the expanding market requirements of white capital, which in the long run would be threatened by an independent Black bourgeoisie. NAFCOC has continually exploited the spaces provided by reforms, but found that obstacles remain, the most recurrent of such stumbling blocks

being the legislative corner-stones of apartheid such as the 1913 Land Act or the Population Registration Act.

In the next section we shall see how NAFCOC has responded to the heightened politicisation of the communities it is based in, to the continued stalling on reform and the increasingly obvious lack of progress of Black business qua stratum in the white-dominated economy.

6. The radicalisation of the aspirant bourgeoisie

"NAFCOC moves Left" read the headline of the Financial Mail article covering NAFCOC's July conference. (61) While the re-adjustment of the organisation to the changing political conditions in the townships and society as a whole had started with the resurgence of township revolt in 1984, many of the conclusions and implications of the "unrest" only coalesced for NAFCOC in late 1985 and early 1986.

At this stage the First State of Emergency had failed to crush the progressive movement; in fact in many spheres organisations had emerged stronger, more resilient and with a larger support base in the townships. NAFCOC conference (July 5-10) sat soon after the imposition of the Second State of Emergency on June 14.

The contradictory position of NAFCOC was clear even from the attendance at the conference: while many delegates, especially from the Eastern Cape, could not attend since they were in detention or in hiding, others had been killed in attacks on councillors' homes and businesses, or had been involved in vigilante attacks on the "comrades".

The "radicalisation" of NAFCOC should best be seen at two levels: firstly at the formal level of NAFCOC as a national federal organisation, with a centralised bureaucracy and links with capital and the state. The positions that NAFCOC (seen on this plane) were to

(61) FM Jul 18 1986

adopt were influenced by a number of factors: pressure from membership, contact with other formal organisations, the degree of progress made in relation to white capital, nature of NAFCOC's relations with the state, the individual attitudes of and influences on leadership of the organisation.

Secondly there is NAFCOC at the local and regional level: the organised voice of traders and petty accumulators in the townships. These operators were exposed on a day-to-day level to the ongoing, grinding polarisation of those communities; as their children debated whether 1986 was going to be "The Year of No School", Casspirs rumbled through the streets and the houses of their neighbours were bombed for "collaboration". The direction these people turned depended on their perception of where their long-term interests lay: with the mass-based popular organisations or with further patronage through the state.

6a. "NAFCOC moves Left"

In his Presidential Address to the 1986 NAFCOC conference, Motsuenyane reviewed the political developments of 85-86 and assessed the contribution and position of NAFCOC.

Review of period June 1985 - June 1986:

A NAFCOC delegation, constituted after unprecedented consultation with such as the UDF, AZASM, Percy Qoboza and Bishop Tutu and consisting of senior NAFCOC members as well as Mrs Ellen Khuzwayo, carried out their mandate from the 1985 conference to meet with the

Minister of Foreign Affairs. Pik Botha's response was to refer NAFCOC to the forthcoming statement of intent in PW Botha's August speech in Durban, later (as the Rubicon Speech) notorious for its lack of any concrete direction.

NAFCOC hosted a National Conference on Disinvestment early in 1986, reportedly well attended by a range of "...organisations, including trade unions, cultural, political, civic and professional bodies". This conference prompted NAFCOC to review its long-standing policy of conditional investment, and broad consensus was reached on the need for black organisations to monitor and regulate foreign investment. (This position was reconsidered however in 1986 after the intensification of the international campaign, the adoption of a total disinvestment position by many of the organisations at the initial conference, after strong critique of the Sullivan proposals had developed within NAFCOC, and after NAFCOC had spoken to the ANC - see below)

Not so well attended was a "Black Leaders Conference" also hosted by NAFCOC in an attempt to shoulder its way into the national political arena. However the conference did expose NAFCOC to a range of progressive opinion, and the basis for Black unity that emerged was hardly reformist, in fact it complemented other attempts at addressing the education crisis, re-iterated the call for the release of Nelson Mandela and put on the agenda the need to evolve "a socio-economic policy that will ensure full participation by blacks without fundamentally destroying the basic fabric of the national economy". Importantly, NAFCOC agreed to securing a "unified Black response to

the reform initiatives of the South African government", thereby at least raising the question of accountability at a formal level in NAFDOC circles.

Perhaps the most striking initiative of NAFDOC in the period June '85 - July '86 was the unprecedented NAFDOC delegation to Lusaka to meet the ANC. The 12-person NAFDOC delegation met with the ANC president Oliver Tambo who "had most of the members of the Executive attending." It is clear that the ANC regarded the meeting as an important opportunity to put to NAFDOC the political imperative of "Unity in Action" with other organisations of the oppressed, and to win NAFDOC over to the need for fundamental change. Issues discussed included "the role of Black business in the liberation struggle", "Desirable economic strategies in the post-apartheid period", the building of national unity amongst the oppressed and the overcoming of ethnic differences, the imperative of co-operation between NAFDOC and other political and labour organisations, the future of the homelands, the education crisis, and "Withdrawal of Foreign Investments as a peaceful means of dismantling apartheid".

For NAFDOC a significant feature of the talks with the ANC was the accessibility of the ANC, their clear leadership qualities and their acceptance of many of NAFDOC's policies and activities. One of the delegation admitted great admiration for the ANC leadership:

"The meeting rectified a lot of incorrect perceptions I had of the ANC due to lack of exposure - it was striking - we realised these are people, you know, not bloodthirsty murderers - they are human, loving and sensitive. They cherish freedom as much as we do" (Personal Interview - WM 22.1.87)

1986 NAFDOC annual conference

Several of the 1986 conference resolutions (62) reflected the changing mood in NAFCCO. The most prominent dealt with the national political crisis:

"Unless the Government ... dismantles apartheid, reveals all discriminatory laws, unbans exiles and all political organisations unconditionally, releases all political detainees and starts meaningful negotiations with the ANC and all other political organisations in determining the future of this country, conference remains convinced that violence, instability and a perpetual State of Emergency will remain the order of the day."

One dealt with the repeal of the Land Act:

"Conference resolves that Until the Government accepts the role of the black farmer and redresses the Land Act of 1913, limited development will take place in a major sector for job creation..."

Another dealt with the national Education crisis, another called on all "employer organisations to secure the immediate release of all trade union leaders," and "not to penalise detainees by making deductions from their salaries or wages". An important resolution was that calling

"on NAFCCO to call a summit meeting to review present policy statements and views on: i) disinvestment, ii) sanctions, iii) participation in any government-created bodies, viz: regional councils, advisory bodies, statutory councils, iv) existing relationships with Government related institutions, v) existing relationships with the private sector.." (see 4th NAFCCO Summit Conference below)

A further blow to the state's project of building a supportive Black middle class was struck with a terse call:

"on the Government to stop futile attempts to reform apartheid by creating costly ineffective measures (sic) but rather to negotiate with acceptable leaders in restructuring our society"

(62) see NAFCCO 1986 conference report

The last two resolutions went hand-in-hand with the decision announced at the conference that NAFCDC would not join the Government's proposed National Statutory Council, which state rhetoric posed as "the starting-point of power-sharing and the beginning of a government of national unity". Motsuenyane told delegates that NAFCDC would not serve on

"any advisory bodies until Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners are released; the ANC and PAC unbanned; and until government starts negotiating with credible Black leaders" (63)

Reports in the liberal press took this as a major blow, if not the death knell of the state's attempt to woo "moderates", which had been a major justification in government rhetoric for the imposition of the June State of Emergency.

4th NAFCDC Summit Conference

This conference, mandated as above, reached compromise positions on the controversial issues before it. They are nevertheless interesting as examples of how far NAFCDC has been pushed politically, and to what extent the organisation is still concerned to further its independent class interests.

While the Summit Conference decided not to debate the merits and de-merits of sanctions, it resolved:

"1. That NAFCDC will not take part in any future efforts to encourage new investments in the country in all cases where Blacks are not meaningfully involved.

"2. that NAFCDC will not campaign to oppose disinvestment or sanctions directed against South Africa and the government in particular,

"3. That there is a case for selective economic pressure unless:

(63) FM July 18 1986

- 3.1 All political prisoners are released.
- 3.2 All Black political organisations are unbanned
- 3.3 Government enters into dialogue with credible Black leaders
- 3.4 Government commits itself to dismantling apartheid" (64)

More controversial resolutions followed, specifically those dealing with the manner in which NAFDOC and Black business was going to take advantage of the "gap" left by departing firms:

"4. that NAFDOC establishes a research unit to look into the possibilities of mobilising financial, technical and other resources to facilitate the indigenisation of those investments that become available as a result of sanctions,

"5. The NAFDOC Management Committee looks into the possibility of appointing a full-time co-ordinator to facilitate the implementation of the programme of 'indigenisation'.

We shall see later to what extent the take-over of departing firms is operating against the interests of progressive organisations.

The second resolution that is important for our purposes deals with the question of participation in government structures. It seems that the summit was unable to reach consensus on the question, and came up with what is in fact a vaguely worded warning:

"Whereas NAFDOC is a federal organisation consisting of various autonomous regions operating in difficult circumstances and

"whereas the people we serve see Government-created bodies and councils on the political and educational front as unacceptable, we therefore, this 4th summit of NAFDOC calls upon its members to exercise caution in associating with these unpopular structures, whilst exercising a local option based on the best judgement of local conditions and the community as a whole."

(64) All 4th Summit resolutions from telex message personally entrusted to PJLH

What seems at first glance an encouraging shift away from an acceptance of the Black Local Authorities and other organs of 'indirect rule' on closer inspection reveals much about the motivations behind NAFCCOC's involvement in politics. Participation or non-participation will not be decided on nationally; businessmen may exercise a 'local option' (unfortunate term!) and decide whether or not to participate on judgment of 'local conditions' and 'the community as a whole'. This implies that if conditions allow it (ie. if the civic or the youth are not strong enough to oppose it, or if vigilantes/the security forces/Inkatha have by force created the space for local authorities) NAFCCOC will not censure participation. On the other hand, in cases where popular organisations are hegemonic and command a following, NAFCCOC would advise against participation. This may be too cynical, but I would argue a fairly accurate interpretation of the conditions prompting this resolution.

The conference continued the old NAFCCOC theme of NAFCCOC being the 'mediator' and centre of unity between organisations, and the facilitator of negotiations between the oppressed and the oppressor:

"Resolution on co-operation with other Black socio-political and professional organisations"

"This 4th summit conference of NAFCCOC acknowledges that one of the most important objectives of NAFCCOC is the establishment of unity in a disunited country.

"This conference further recognises the need for NAFCCOC to maintain an image that will enable NAFCCOC to act as an agent for Black unity so as to facilitate the formulation of a Black agenda in any negotiations that may ensue between the government and the oppressed people of this country.

"It is therefore resolved: that NAFCOC should ensure that there is ongoing consultation and co-operation between itself and all other Black socio-political and professional organisations that are relevant to the larger issues facing the Black people of Southern Africa.

"However, members of NAFCOC should refrain from perpetuating a situation in which party politics dilutes the freedom of NAFCOC to formulate its economic policies."

What is clear here is NAFCOC's continued attempts to insert itself into national politics, to claim a major role due to its 'black' nature and its contribution to "black advancement", without subordinating itself to the discipline of any political force or jeopardising its profits.

Leaving the 4th Summit, we move on to an example of NAFCOC carrying out its intentions of bringing together different political organisations.

"The people's economic convention"

Hosted by the National Transvaal Regional Convention (NATRECO) a grouping of all Transvaal regional chambers, the "convention" brought together 500 delegates of different persuasions; including AZAPO, AZASO and schools organisations, NECC members Vusi Khanyile and Ms S Mohajane, Bishop Tutu, Herbert Vilakazi and prominent NAFCOC members. (65)

The keynote speaker, NATRECO president and NAFCOC vice-president Moss Nxumalo delivered a speech entitled "Black business and the need for re-alignment", ending with the words "black man you are on your

(65) see African Business vol 13 no 12 p17

own". This seems to sum up the mood and purpose of the get-together: the assertion of Black business that they are prepared to align themselves with the broad democratic movement if space is made for them in the post-apartheid set-up.

Unban the ANC

The brouhaha about the funding for the advertisement on Thursday January 8 calling for the unbanning of the ANC served to suppress its most important political feature: the massive range of organisations supporting the call. While the advertisement was placed by the UDF, NECC and SACC, it was supported by: COSATU, the Black Sash, the National Soccer League, the Health Workers' Association, the Call of Islam, the Release Mandela Committee, the South African National Students' Congress, the Transvaal Indian Congress, the Natal Indian Congress, the South African Rugby Union, the Transvaal anti-PC Committee, the Federation of Transvaal Women, the Democratic Lawyers Association, NAMDA, the National Taverners Association, and the Southern Transvaal Chamber of Commerce (SOUTACOC).

The Unban the ANC advert came after months of gathering support for the National United Action campaign of the UDF, NECC, SACC and COSATU, the aim of which was to: "broaden the base of resistance and draw into the people's camp more and more of those elements forced by the State of Emergency to take a definite political stand against

apartheid", and to "isolate the apartheid government even further".

(66)

The fact of this close co-operation does not of course mean that SOUTACOC is about to transform itself into a revolutionary mass-based organisation committed to building working-class leadership, nor are they about to affiliate to the UDF. However it indicates a willingness on the part of an important sector of NAFCOC to align itself to the democratic movement and expose itself to attacks both from within NAFCOC and from the state.

Asked about the contact SOUTACOC had with Black political organisations, SOUTACOC president Willie McBain-Charles refused to give much detail for security reasons, but stated:

" We are exposed to progressive forces - we are aligned to sentiments of freedom....But there is no question of affiliation - we have a diverse membership and we must cater for their broader aspirations as well".
(Personal Interview 22.1.87)

Other sources revealed that SOUTACOC had regularly met with political organisations and youth leaders, and had contributed regularly to the financing of funerals and other mass gatherings. SOUTACOC had moreover established a "Soweto Relief Fund" for the families and dependents of unrest victims. (personal interview - MR 16.1.87)

What is also very clear is the amount of division even within Progressives within NAFCOC. McBain-Charles clearly had sympathies with AZAPO, presumably more for its Black Consciousness history than

its socialist rhetoric, while other office-bearers also had a distinct Africanist approach. This would clearly lead to problems and conflict when the question arose of relating to Charterist forces in the UDF.

As the campaign for national unity progresses, Charterist forces win hegemony over the progressive movement as a whole and people's power is built, it is likely that relations between peripheral organisations of the oppressed such as NAFCOC and the democratic movement will become closer and stronger.

On the ground: traders in the townships

The consumer boycotts

An explicit secondary goal of the consumer boycott campaign (apart from exerbating contradictions between state and sectors of its white constituency) was to bring all sectors of the townships together in a unified and disciplined campaign.

As one consumer boycott organiser said:

"the boycott brings together workers, students, church people, businessmen and the rural communities into practical action against the government and its policies. For purposes of immediate mobilisation this form of unity is crucial and we are committed to maintain it. This class alliance, together with other forms of democratic struggle, must inevitably shake the government". (67)

Transvaal UDF representatives said clearly that one of the aims of the boycott was to form an alliance with the black middle class,

'though it should be subject to popular discipline'. (68) Given the concern of NAFDOC for its own independence from the agendas of other organisations, at an organisational level at least this will be difficult. The participation of NAFDOC as an organisation in the consumer boycotts was hesitant and unenthusiastic.

As Gabriel Mokgoko, NAFDOC public relations manager expressed it:

"We support the lifting of the state of emergency because we are conscious of what it does to us as businessmen and to our community. We can't stay aloof from calls against the state of emergency otherwise we are seen as part of the system" (69)

The hesitance of the umbrella organisation and its leadership to come out in full support of the boycott strategy reflected the disparity between regions: many NAFDOC members, especially in the Bantustans, had been implicated in vigilante attacks on comrades; while in Natal the Inkatha/Kwazulu trader organisation, Inyanda Chamber of Commerce, came out against the consumer boycott. Inyanda president and NAFDOC deputy president, PG Gumede, rapped Inyanda members for meeting with the boycott committee:

"At a time when I am busy appealing to the white private sector to assist in the rehabilitation of black businesses, I cannot on the other hand be seen to be condoning the actions of Fosatu, and those who join them, in advocating the consumer boycott". (Financial Mail 13.8.87)

However in many areas traders did at least support the boycott, lowering their prices or staying open longer, if they did not become integrally involved in the organisation of the campaign. Seekings (1986:7) claims that the interests of the "lumpen-capitalists" in

(68) Ibid op. cit.

(69) Ibid p11

draw individual businessmen into counter-revolutionary activities. Their success will depend on the degree to which the aspirant bourgeoisie as a whole has been pulled into the national democratic alliance.

In Port Elizabeth the strength of the multi-class alliance in the townships gave the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO) a mass base in all the areas under its 'jurisdiction'. An academic close to the organisation described it as resting on an alliance of:
"the lumpen element in the amabutho, the middle class, the organised working-class, women and squatters"
(Personal Interview MS 19.1.87)

In recent meetings with representatives of the Dept of Constitutional Development about the possible upgrading of the African townships, the NAFCOC affiliate, the Port Elizabeth Chamber of Commerce (PECCOC) attended with PEBCO in a joint delegation. Observers remarked that when economic issues were raised, PEBCO handed over to PECCOC, who continued the negotiations. It is clear that in this area NAFCOC members perceive their long-term interests as lying with the popular organisations and their programme of national liberation.

Rents boycotts

Rents boycotts are in force in 54 townships countrywide, in some areas with no residents paying rent since September 1984. The Soweto town council alone is losing R6 million per month, (70) while the

(70) Financial Mail 15.8.86

boycott as a whole is estimated to be costing the state some R50m per month.

Traders and the aspirant African bourgeoisie as a whole have no direct short-term class interests in participating in the rents boycotts. Indirectly they may gain from the fact that their customers have considerably more to spend each month. However observers say the excess is mostly going into consumer durables, bought at white shops, into education or into savings. (Personal Interview 19.1.87)

It is clear that many of the aspirant bourgeoisie are participating in the rents boycott, as well as the street committees that burgeoned in their wake. This is due not only to the fact that they do not want to "be seen not to be interested in community problems and mistaken for a sellout" (Pearl Luthuli, editor of True Love FM 12.12.86), ie. overt community pressure, but also because of the power of the community organisations and their ability to confront issues of common concern and deal with them - in fact the development of alternative power structures to those of the state.

The manner in which the state has responded has drawn on the lessons of the first State of Emergency, in which the overt repression quite obviously broadened the base of support of community organisations and the progressive movement as a whole. The approach favoured in the second Emergency has been integrated with the "total strategy" of the Joint Monitoring Committees: to de-politicise conditions in the townships by upgrading African areas, to engage in a "hearts and minds" ideological campaign, and to destroy the unity of those communities through co-option and vigilante action. A

document leaked to the Community Research Group in August 1986 (71) detailed the approach to be followed in breaking the boycott.

Firstly, legal action must be taken against defaulters; but it was important that the initial targets chosen should be able to pay the amount outstanding, thus they should be businessmen or well-off households. Second, employers should be approached for names of workers and the possibility of deducting rent by stop-order from wages. Third, groups of residents should be persuaded that they should pay rent. This 'persuasion' could take place through the press and pamphlet blitzes, through councillors meeting (with "SAP support") with their constituents, or through contact with the youth at 'weekend camps', where they would be told of the necessity of paying rent ("for the upliftment of socio-economic circumstances).

This multi-strategy intervention would be accompanied by attempts to set up alternative "authority structures" for the 'enforcement of discipline within the context of the family structure' in the townships, as an attempt to combat the hegemony of the civics' street and area committees. These 'authority structures' should be linked to 'law and order committees' in each area that would implement the decisions of the structures.

Clearly this is an attempt to divide the community along class lines and to re-establish a network of control outside the Progressive movement. This would involve the co-option of elements that are susceptible to a discourse of 'restoring law and order'

(which could include migrant workers, profiteering businessmen and lumpen youth) and the attempted resurrection of the networks that operated around the Black local authorities in the political vacuum of the late 70's.

While the collapse of these networks occurred largely due to the rise of the insurrectionary climate and the growth and deepening of organisation in the townships, a major contributory factor was the collapse of local authorities due to the lack of a fiscal base. The introduction of the Regional Services Councils is aimed at redistributing resources from the white local authorities to the black areas, and could provide the necessary funds for the re-establishment of local authorities and their accompanying patronage networks in the townships.

6c. A discussion of the nature of the "radicalisation" phenomenon

We have seen NAFCOC forced into a more confrontationist approach vis-a-vis the state on two levels: that of NAFCOC the national organisation and that of NAFCOC members in the thick of the intensifying civil war in the townships. Any discussion of the likelihood of the tendencies identified above continuing must necessarily be conjecture.

At this stage all we can do is identify the factors which on the one hand would urge greater identification with the goals of the democratic movement and greater co-operation with mass democratic organisations, and on the other hand those which would hinder

radicalisation and promote division, complacency and conservatism amongst the African aspirant bourgeoisie.

Factors promoting unity of the oppressed:

Undoubtedly the greatest spur to a disciplined unity under the leadership of the working class is the growth and strengthening of organisations of the people in a disciplined relationship to the democratic movement, and the development of structures of democratic self-rule in the townships. It is when such structures are able to assert their hegemony over the community that the aspirant bourgeoisie can be pulled into a disciplined national-democratic alliance. Until then the interests of the aspirant bourgeoisie, while in contradiction with state and white capital, will push it along an "independent" and vacillating course, unwilling to subordinate itself to any discipline or to expose itself.

The building of this national unity (national here used in two senses: that of 'country-wide' and that of 'the African nation-in-becoming') depends on the correct approach being continued by revolutionary organisations, that at all times they are prepared to broaden the ranks of those united in action against the apartheid regime and its supporters, in order to weaken and isolate the latter.

Thus the UDF, in an assessment of the strategic imperatives of the moment:

"To defend our gains and take forward our fight for freedom, we need to deepen organisations where they exist, establish organisations where they do not, and build greater unity between all forces opposed to apartheid minority rule." (72)

If organisations do not follow this course, and instead follow a sectarian strategy that ignores the dominant contradiction and the determinacy of national oppression in constituting classes in political struggle, the grave possibility exists that they will be delivering up allies and supporters to the regime without a fight.

An important factor related to the above is that of mass community pressure that need not be linked to organisation. Thus the mere fact that more than 90% of NAFCOC members have day-to-day contact with the working masses and the unemployed means that in a direct sense they must be sensitive to the sentiments of the majority of township residents. If they are not, and continue to pursue self-aggrandisement at the obvious expense of their customers, they are immediately liable to overt duress, be it in the form of an informal boycott or violent attacks. At the 1985 annual conference NAFCOC set up a "Commission of enquiry into the destruction of black businesses during the unrest", the preliminary findings of which were circulated confidentially before the 1986 conference, and were, observers say, an important pressure on NAFCOC to align itself more closely with the "progressive forces".

The pressure exerted on the aspirant bourgeoisie, and the growing sympathy of the latter to fundamental change is greatly facilitated by the degree of access the masses have to the aspirants: both groups live in the same geographical areas, use the same facilities and live under the same conditions. In these conditions, a product of primitive apartheid, community solidarity is relatively easy to

tain. This fact is recognised by strategists close to state and capital:

"Do you create stability if you bottle up your highly-skilled workers and your managerial class with the lowest level of labourer? To use Marxist or ANC terms, do you put the Bourgeois-elite in the same town as your proletarian army?" (Gilliomee 1981:68)

A major factor that has prompted impatience at an organisational level has been the lack of progress made by NAFCOD members in the white-dominated economy, both as traders in competition with white commercial capital and as professionals in the monopoly corporate sphere. In the first case, this is due mainly to the incompatibility of the interests of white monopoly capital and those of the aspirant African commercial bourgeoisie. The latter, at the level of development of "competitive capital", requires state protection and guaranteed markets if it is to make progress. Neither are likely to be forthcoming in the current economic climate.

In the second case, despite the rhetoric about "affirmative action programmes", the economy remains in white hands and is likely to do so for the foreseeable future. More than 90% of management in South Africa is white - a grouping that makes up less than 15% of the population. Whites expect senior positions and lucrative remuneration to remain their preserve, and seem to be fighting a rear-guard action against attempts by senior management and black professionals to change that. We have referred above to the speech made by Barlows' Rosholt about the "Businessman's role in the changing circumstances of South Africa", where he referred to the need for businessmen to advance "Blacks into senior managerial positions". It appears that

this project was encountering 'white attitudinal problems' amongst lower-level management.

The fact remains that through legislative and social factors, whites hold a monopoly of economic power, and that basic structure is not going to change overnight. As Bobby Godsell, Premier Milling "whizz-kid", put it to the Long Range Planning Association:

"...industry in South Africa is the joint effort of capital, that is, in part White, in part foreign, and Black labour. For a long period of time now industry is going to have a particular capital structure that is not going to change. We are not going to see in the next five years a Black Harry Oppenheimer or Wim de Villiers..." (73)

The fact of the impossibility of the accomodation of the aspirant African bourgeoisie as a class into the structure of South African monopoly capital is a further spur to that grouping to seek fundamental change.

This attitude was expressed consistently in interviews with up-and-coming NAFCOC leadership. People reacted angrily to mention of such as the SBDC or the Urban Foundation, which "still have a patronising attitude".

"I don't believe that the Urban Foundation could say that what they are doing is in the country's best interests..... they don't consult, they seem to be thinking 'we know better than you' - they don't get our general support... they are patronising and paternalist... they speak to the [Franklin] Sonns of this world who claim to know what we are about !" (Personal Interview - WM 22.1.87)

Similarly the initiative to open the Central Business Districts has been seen as 'too little too late':

(73) in panel discussion at Long Range Planning Society of Southern Africa Second Annual Conference, 17th March 1981

"it should have happened years ago... its just like the pass system - there were no parties. But its typical they say to us 'you may trade in town, but you cannot live in town'" (Ibid.)

Trader organisations seemed to have a fairly sophisticated understanding of the motivations behind opening up CBDs: they see it as the flip-side justification for the penetration by white capital of the African market: 'the white markets are saturated - they seek an additional untapped market in the Black areas and used deregulation as an excuse to move in'.

This perception of deregulation, hailed as 'the beginning of a new era' by state and capital, seriously mars the chances of the opening of CBDs in any way moderating the pressure from NAFCOC for change. If anything it will encourage an intensification of demands for real change.

Factors militating against solidarity across classlines

The major force attempting to disrupt the unity of the oppressed is the state and its strategies of "divide and rule". For the strategy of winning over a black middle class supportive of the status quo the next two years will be decisive.

At one level it is crucial for the state's urbanisation policy that the state through the JMCs and their surrogate forces win the battle over the rents boycotts. The 'orderly urbanisation' policy hides the intention of dividing the urban community into poor and wealthier strata, the former being liable for eviction and removal to "deconcentrated" areas in or near the bantustans, while a programme

of upgrading and home ownership continues in the townships bordering the white cities. The strategy envisages a 'buffer' of middle-class black areas surrounding the white suburbs, while the poor and unemployed will live beyond the black suburbs.

The process whereby this would be achieved would be the gradual reduction of state subsidy for housing, thus gradually squeezing out the poorer residents to the outlying 'site-and-service schemes'. (74)

Obviously the rents boycotts pose a major threat to this plan, and this would add extra urgency to initiatives of the JMCs to break the boycotts. At this stage rents boycotts are taking off nationally, and in their wake street committees are deepening and strengthening the hold of democratic organisations over the townships. It seems unlikely that the boycotts can be broken without the application of force on the scale of genocide, but conditions are not static. These factors place extra responsibility on the democratic movement to extend and broaden the base of the community organisations.

Similarly the state is depending on the ability of the combination of repression and co-optation through the JMCs and other interventions to create the space for the resuscitation of local authorities and their accompanying patronage network. The Regional Services Councils are seen as an attempt to overcome the weaknesses of the Black Local Authorities in several ways:

- * they redistribute substantial resources from the white local authorities to their black counterparts,

* they facilitate the withdrawal of the state from the provision of public services, thereby depoliticising socio-economic demands, and deflecting national political demands to the local level. (Cobbett et al 1985:11)

However commentators are skeptical about the degree of success the new structures will achieve. The most damning feature is the illegitimacy of the local authorities and the level of mass resistance to them. It will, in the context of present levels of politicisation, be nigh impossible to attract members to sit on reconstituted local authorities or to give them any veneer of legitimacy. The RSCs are still extremely undemocratic, and by no means a replacement for political power. Moreover the economic crisis currently facing the state and capital, and divisions within the state and the ruling bloc over the optimum method to redistribute to the townships, will paralyse both the legitimacy and the redistributive functions of the Regional Services Councils.

The conservative tendencies identified in the NAFCOC leadership grouping will be around for a few more years, and will thus continue to promote caution in the organisation's activities. However a position of neutrality is going to be increasingly difficult to sustain with younger and more impatient leaders rising through the ranks of the NAFCOC bureaucracy.

Motsuenyane is due to retire in the next five years, and the man tipped to replace him as NAFCOC president is NAFCOC deputy president and NATRECOC president Moss Nxumalo. Nxumalo was central to the convening of the 'People's Economic Convention' in November 1986 and

was involved in Enos Mabuza's Inyanga movement, a constituent organisation of the Black Alliance of the 70's which has subsequently worked closely with the UDF in the KaNgwane homeland and the Eastern Transvaal. It is likely that Nxumalo will steer the organisation unambiguously into the people's camp.

However certain divisive tendencies are likely to remain. I have already mentioned the antagonism of several leadership people to the Charter and Charterist organisations. This is a challenge to the latter forces to win over NAFCOC as a whole to accept the leadership of the democratic movement and Charterist forces within that movement.

The potential for division also exists at the level of accumulation. Although the vast majority of NAFCOC members are sensitive and vulnerable to community pressure, avenues still remain that are immune to mass pressure, being out of sight of the masses and independent of the township mass consumer economy.

A prime example of such "freeways to accumulation" is that of the construction industry, previously dominated by white developers. The latter are unable to send white construction firms into the townships at present, and have sought out black construction companies to do the job. It has not been coincidental that the majority of those black construction firms that have been involved have been close to the community councils, often the first to hear of the contracts. (Personal Interview - MS 19.1.87)

Another prime example of the possibility of the resuscitation of the patronage networks has been the privatisation of the liquor trade. Where before shebeen-owners (a primary segment of the patronage networks) were often the first to be disciplined by comrades because of their role in promoting anti-social behaviour. With the sale of 90% of the Administration Boards' beer-halls and hotels has arisen a potent opportunity for accumulation in the hands of the aspirant petty-bourgeoisie. The value of the sale of traditional beer, the majority of which is sold by the development boards, was R694m in 1983, while Blacks consume 56% of the commercial malt beer sold in South Africa. (75)

Not surprisingly, the majority of liquor licences went to the councillors and their friends, and legal bottle stores have been incredibly lucrative for their owners, but often the first targets of 'unrest'.

Another example of a "freeway to accumulation" is that of the bid by black business, some closely connected to NAFCOC, to buy up the stock and capital of divesting companies. The company initiating the campaign, Black Equity Participation, consists of Soweto Civic figurehead Dr Nthato Motlana, ex-Urban Bantu Councillor Richard Maponya and Inkatha member Gibson Thula. BEP's formal motivation seems to have resonance with the position of many NAFCOC members: while it appreciates the efforts by the state and private enterprise in assisting small black businesses,

(75) see Strydom, J F: "Privatisation and the sorghum beer industry"; MBA Wits 1985

"the penetrating question must be asked whether blacks are to be assigned forever to the role of small entrepreneurs - while middle and major industry remains in the hands of whites." (Weekly Mail 6.2.87)

Thus the BEP will also be attempting to increase black holdings on such major companies as Anglo American and Sanlam in order to attempt to influence the direction of these companies.

The objective of the BEP is "unashamedly business", but the motivation is projected as the need to whittle away white control of the economy:

"the commitment and driving force would be to allow as many blacks as possible to share in a wide range of investments."

BEP's plans have been roundly criticised by both COSATU and the ANC. Said a COSATU spokesperson:

"The buyout plan does nothing to solve the problems of the country, nor does it address the poverty, unemployment and low wages suffered by the majority.

"All it does is allow a few individuals to make capital out of that suffering and out of the struggle to end apartheid and exploitation." (Ibid.)

The connection of the BEP plan with imperialist designs on South Africa is less obvious but definite; the BEP's bankers are the African Bank and US giant Citibank, while the plan ties in neatly with a years-old "constructive engagement" commitment to building black business.

In 1983 USAID announced it would provide R3,5m over four years to train black businessmen, and for this purpose it signed an agreement with NAFED in September of that year. Said a party to the agreement:

"the aid is a way of saying that constructive engagement is not only aimed at Pretoria, but that blacks can benefit too." (FM Nov 4 1983)

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Early in 1986, on a trip to Southern Africa, the United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Africa, James Kelly, announced a comprehensive plan to stimulate the black private sector, including business fairs, executive exchanges and business advice.

Kelly linked the programme to the question of disinvestment:
"I will try to convince the US commercial sector that this type of assistance will do more to help South African blacks than disinvestment campaigns." (FM 7.2.87)

In March of that year signatories of the Sullivan Code (called Task Group 7) met with black businessmen to discuss their major problems. A steering committee drawn from both groups has been set up to suggest areas of involvement for American business. The major areas were: finance, training, and commerce between the two.

The BEP project clearly is a continuation of the concern of imperialist companies to develop a buffer of aspirant Black bourgeoisie. Thus when Coca-Cola finally pulled out in September 1986, it announced a plan to sell its 30% stake in Amalgamated Beverage Industries to 'unnamed groups of black businessmen'. Said Donald R Keough, President of Coke,

"...the decision to withdraw should be seen as a statement of this company's opposition to apartheid and our support for the economic aspirations of Black South Africans."

"Our object is not solely to disinvest. We will disinvest in a way that creates significant multiracial equity participation in the South African soft-drink industry." (Business Times 21.9.86 - my emphasis)

Thus there are numerous avenues for significant accumulation in the present political climate, whereby the aspirant black bourgeoisie is able to establish itself independent of the township economy and in

spite of competitive pressure from white capital and continued obstacles from the state.

However, in relation to the size of the aspirant bourgeoisie as a whole, and even more so in relation to the size of the African proletariat, the political significance of these "freeways to accumulation" is hardly a threat. However vigilance must be ensured that the potential of these strands to bind themselves into a counter-revolutionary force is not realised.

One last area we must look at is that of the "Private Sector Council On Urbanisation" an initiative of the Urban Foundation. The full list of members and constituent committees is appended (Appendix 2). What is clear is that here is an alliance between "progressive" sectors of monopoly capital and figurehead leadership allied to the democratic movement. Monopoly capital is clearly attempting to ensure itself a role in a future South Africa through the co-option of those close to the democratic movement, with enough sway to deliver at least some of its less politicised constituency to support continued monopoly power. The degree to which it succeeds will depend on the level of consciousness of the alliance that takes state power, as well as the strength and degree of development of grassroots democratic organisation, that will not be party to such a scheme.

Conclusion

The theoretical discussion that began this paper suggested that the political position that a class adopts in struggle cannot simply be read off from its position in relation to the means of production.

A class' political position depends on its insertion into the entire "ensemble of political and ideological relations of domination" that characterise the social formation. While at this level of abstraction, one cannot identify 'classes' in operation as one can at the level of the 'Mode of Production', there are nevertheless empirically observable social groups whose political behaviour is determined 'in the last instance' by their relation to the means of production.

Such an observable grouping is the 'aspirant African bourgeoisie'; a bourgeoisie because it owns and controls the means of production to a limited degree, aspirant because as yet it's access to political power is limited by the structural contradiction traversing the form of state: the dominant contradiction between oppressor and oppressed.

The orthodox approach to the South African revolution, as developed and sophisticated by adherents of this "Colonialism of a Special Type" framework, stresses the commonality of interests of all oppressed classes, and the possibility and political necessity of the unity of all oppressed classes in national-democratic struggle.

The "reform" process embarked on by the state and monopoly capital in the 70s, particularly after the accession of PW Botha and the partial implementation of the "Total Strategy" approach, was centrally directed at programmatically addressing the organic crisis afflicting the social formation as a whole, especially the crisis of legitimacy the state faced amongst the oppressed, who had united across class boundaries under the banner of Black Consciousness in the 70's. Central to state strategy was the exacerbation of divisions between the oppressed, along ethnic, geographical and class lines.

Thus monopoly capital and the state embarked on a campaign to identify and stimulate the growth of a "Black middle class", as well as promote support from that class for top-down reform.

We have discussed aspects of the history of NAFCOC, the prime representative of the "black middle class". This would indicate that one cannot reduce NAFCOC, even in the relative quiet of the early and mid 70's, to a lap-dog of state and capital. On the contrary, NAFCOC has consistently defended its independence and sought out avenues for the advancement of the class interests of its membership. While for a long time the interests of some NAFCOC members were served through participation in state structures, neither NAFCOC as a whole nor the whole aspirant African bourgeoisie have ever allowed themselves to be seen as supportive of the "system".

The fact that NAFCOC has been a true representative of its constituent classes renders the fact of the rapprochement between

itself and the organisations of the working masses politically important: to what extent can the organisation be relied on in a formal alliance? How consistent will the middle classes be in the revolutionary alliance? Is the participation of these classes narrow opportunism or do they have an objective interest in national liberation?

The discussion we have gone through indicates two things. Firstly that the interests of NAFCOC are opposed to those of the state and capital not only politically, but also economically: that the aspirant African Bourgeoisie has an interest in the overthrow of monopoly capital and the democratisation of the economy.

Secondly, in areas where the oppressed have forged cross-class unity and begun to develop alternative democratic governmental structures, the aspirant bourgeoisie have been drawn into mass campaigns and are subordinating themselves to a degree to the democratic will of the community.

As the structural economic crisis in South Africa intensifies, the contradiction between the interests of competitive African capital and those of monopoly capital will worsen, making any durable alliance between the two impossible, and forcing NAFCOC and other organisations to support the anti-monopoly and anti-imperialist dimensions of the national-democratic struggle.

This strategic imperative comes with a word of caution: while the working class' principle strategic objective in this, the first stage of the great uninterrupted struggle for socialism, is national liberation and the attainment of an independent, socialist-oriented state, the conditions under which that stage is reached and the degree of democratic practice that is achieved depends on the ability now of the African working class to attain hegemony over the united front. While there are no (and can be no) guarantees in struggle, the participation of all oppressed classes in struggle must be subordinated to the discipline of the vanguard of that struggle, and independent agendas and divisive activity cannot be ignored.

APPENDIX 1

(Breakdown of representative sample of
NAFDOC members by occupation - December 1986.)

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number</u>
1. Restaurant	861
2. General Dealer	2583
3. Dairy	93
4. Butcher	349
5. Bottle Store	399
6. Construction	26
7. Estate Agency	7
8. Attorneys	22
9. Doctors	31
10. Hardware	38
11. Typing	2
12. Pharmacy	9
13. Herbalist	33
14. Tourism	35
15. Marketing	26
16. Consultants	86
17. Transport	89
18. Outfitters	21
19. Garage	71
20. Mining	2
21. School and Education	91
22. Furniture	8
23. Hair Salons	56
24. Bakery	11
25. Opticians	2
26. Finance	14
27. Green grocer	219
28. Artist/ Photography	37
29. Coal dealer	26
30. Soft goods/draper	5
31. Undertaker	13
32. Dry cleaner	11
33. Shoe Repairer	4
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>5280</u>

PRIVATE SECTOR COUNCIL ON URBANISATION

Mr J H Steyn (Chairman)

Mr L G Abrahamse	Mr Z W Mtuli	Mr S Kutumela	} NAFCOC
Rev C Begbie	Mr H F Oppenheimer	Mr S Kubheka	
Bishop M Buthelesi	Mr E Pavitt		
Dr Z J de Beer	Mr A M Rosholt	Mr V Brett	} ASSOCOM
Dr M V Gumede	Rev S J Sebidi	Mr V M Ridgway	
Mr T W Kamhule	Mr J Seutloadi		
Mr O Kunene	Mr I J Sims	Mr F Stockenström	} AHI
Dr R H Lee	Mr F A Sonn	Mr T I Steenkamp	
Mrs D M Mabiletsa	Rev B Tlagale		
Mrs M Malepa	Dr A J J Wassels	Dr J van Syl	} FCI
Mrs M Maponya		Mr J Frankel	
Mr D J Mokoena			
Mrs S Motlana		Dr D L van Coller	} SEIPSA
		Mr D S Harris	

OBSERVERS : Mr P H Bosman) Chamber of Mines
Mr J A Jooste) SAAU

URBAN FOUNDATION
URBANISATION UNIT

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Dr R H Lee (Chairman)

Chairman of Working Groups	1 Representative of each of the 5 Organisations	Business of the Council	Independent Expert Members (as appropriate)
L G Abrahamse Bishop M Buthelesi R Hofmeyr I J Sims	Mr V Brett (ASSOCOM) Mr J Frankel (FCI) Mr S Kubheka (NAFCOC) Mr F Stockenström (AHI) Mr D L van Coller (SEIPSA) Observers: Mr P H Bosman (Chamber of Mines) Mr J A Jooste (SAAU)	Dr Z J de Beer Mrs S Motlana Mr J Seutloadi Dr A J J Wassels	Prof L Schlemmer

WORKING GROUPS

MURAL DEVELOPMENT	HOUSING & URBAN DEV	EMPLOY & REG DEV	URBAN MGMT & GOVERNMENT
I J Sims (Chairman) L P Bartel (AHI) J Harrison (ASSOCOM) A Hammond-Tooke (FCI) S Mokoena (NAFCOC) A Evans J A Jooste (SAAU) J September A Bernstein	Mr L G Abrahamse (Chairman) Mr B van Grien (AHI) Mr L K Japhet (FCI) Mr M Lephosa (NAFCOC) Mr I J Sims Mr R S K Tucker Mr P Joubert Mr D Ncube Ms A Bernstein	Mr R Hofmeyr (Chairman) Mr D C B Bredenkamp (AHI) Mr E M Groeneweg (ASSOCOM) Mr L A Beard (FCI) Mr S S R Mphahle (NAFCOC) Mr I J Hetherington Mr I C R Macdonald Mr D Richter Ms A Bernstein	Bishop M Buthelesi (Ch) Mr C Ball (Vice Chairman) Mr H van der Walt (AHI) Mr N Mandy (ASSOCOM) Prof M Wiethers (FCI) Mr E F T Mashilo (NAFCOC) Mr C P L Diener Mr T Gillson Professor L Schlemmer Ms A Bernstein
<u>Consultants</u> : M de Klerk	<u>Consultants</u> : Urban Foundation (Ms J Strelitz)	<u>Consultants</u> : Prof G Maasdorp	<u>Consultants</u> : Urban Foundation Urbanisation Unit

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